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One part of the modem Revolution in Military Mfairs (RMA) is the possibility of a new 
form of warfare-often called information warfare. Development of information warfare 
depends on technological advances, systems development and adaptation of operational 
approaches and organizational structures. This thesis assesses the implications of 
information warfare for the technology and systems development areas, with the 
underlying motivation of ensuring the military is postured to "win the information warfare 
RMA" through effective research, development and acquisition. This assessment takes 
place primarily through a "Delphi" process designed to generate discussion between 
selected information warfare experts about the impacts of information warfare. This thesis 
concludes that information warfare is largely dependent on commercial information 
technology. This dependence means the military should rely on the commercial sector for 
most technological advances and products-with government research funds focused on 
military-unique research areas. Use of commercial items, coupled with DoD standard 
architectures, may enable a decentralization of information warfare acquisition to the user 
level. Finally, this dependence means the acquisition system should focus on architecture 
development, technology insertion, systems integration and on managing functions and 
services of systems-primarily through development of operational software to run on 
mostly commercial hardware. 
v 
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Today, many feel that the world is in the midst of a Revolution in Military Mfairs 
(RMA). The changes behind this RMA consist primarily of advances in information 
technology, which in turn enable gains in the precision, range and lethality of conventional 
weapons. But beyond enhancing how war was conducted in the past, many argue that a 
new form of warfare-called information warfare-is now possible. As part of an RMA, 
development of information warfare depends on technological changes, systems 
development and the adaptation of operational approaches and organizational structures in 
order to take advantage of this new capability. In terms of information warfare, much of the 
focus has been on assessing the operational and organizational issues. Less attention has 
been paid to the impacts on research and acquisition activities. Thus the focus of this thesis 
is on examining the nature of information warfare and the implications of the defining 
characteristics of information warfare for the research and acquisition systems. 
Modern information warfare is heavily based on the use of information technology. 
With such use comes dependency, that in tum creates vulnerabilities that may be attacked 
and must be defended. The process of attacking an enemy's inform~tion and information 
technology vulnerabilities for any political or military pul-pose and the protection of one's 
own information and information technology is the essence of information warfare. The 
nature of information warfare is further delineated by the qualities of information 
technology itself: 
xi 
• Has its own rules and limitations based on the unique traits of information technology 
• No cleanly segregable systems in the traditional sense-more like C4I systems 
• Dependent on commercial technologies available to most anyone 
• Any warfare edge largely based on effective integration and exploitation. of technology 
These characteristics of lead to an investigation of whether the nature of information 
warfare will have specific impacts on technology research and acquisition activities. 
Similar to the steps of a generic RMA, the impact of information warfare on 
acquisition can be probed by examining three different areas: technology, organization, and 
process. In terms of technology development, sowing the seeds for tomorrow's 
information warfare technology will require that the military engage with the commercial 
sector for the technologies to satisfy a large portion of military needs. Then the military 
would be free to spend its own limited funds on "investments in the margins" to address 
requirements not met by commercial developments. Some information technology 
characteristics may also make possible changes in the organizational structure of how such 
systems or services are acquired. One may be able to move to a decentralized system where 
users determine their own requirements and then local information technologists are largely 
free to buy, install and support their own equipment and services to meet their own user's 
information warfare needs. Promoting activities that enable this type of decentralization 
may be a key role of the acquisition world. Such activities would include continuation of 
R&D for military-unique issues, support for development of standards and architectures, 
development of contract purchase vehicles and demonstration of new technologies as a way 
to educate users. The organization to do this may not be that structurally different from 
today, although it might be greatly simplified and streamlined. Inste~d, it may promote ad 
xii 
hoc alliances to address specific needs or collaborate on individual programs using modem 
information technologies. In terms of acquisition process, moves should be made to an 
incremental acquisition approach to keep up with advancing technology. There should be 
continual cycles of technology insertion via test beds and technology demonstrations such 
that the underlying system is never procured and disposed of in the traditional manner. 
With this goes an emphasis on managing the more stable functions that make up systems 
and on the information services required by the user. In many cases these functions will be 
embodied in mission-unique software and thus a prime focus of the acquisition process 
should be on development of operational software and integration of mostly commercial 
systems. In addition, the promise exists of cases where it may be cheaper and more 
effective to lease information technology or to discard an obsolete information appliance at 
the end of its useful life. Last is the issue of how to promote product integrity during · 
design and development. To protect systems from information warfare risks, it will be 
important to ensure the systems engineering process includes activities that assess critical 
areas and that take steps to mitigate information warfare threats to critical system functions. 
In sum, the defining characteristics of information warfare do prompt the need for 
changes in the acquisition community. Changes that range from focusing R&D on military-
unique technologies useful in information warfare to organizational modifications in 
information technology acquisition to adjustments and improvements in the acquisition 
process. Changes that are key to ensuring the U.S. has the best chance of realizing the full 






Victory smiles upon those who anticipate changes in the character of 
war. Not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes 
occur. 
- Italian Air Marshall Guilio Doubet 
Ever since the dawn of time when an unknown hominid first took up a tree branch 
(a tool) and smote his fellow hominid, warfare and tools have been inextricably linked. But 
the tools of warfare are no longer tree branches. With each new jump in tool-making 
(technology), often comes a matching increase in warfare capabilities. In a litany familiar to 
those who study such subjects, tree branches gave way to obsidian-tipped spears, copper 
swords yielded to iron swords, suits of armor to gunpowder-driven projectiles, and so on. 
Such progress has continued to recent times with the introduction of aircraft, combustion-
engine vehicles, thermonuclear devices and the microchip. And sometimes the exploitation, 
development and fielding of these major technological advances have also enabled elemental 
changes or revolutions in the conduct of military affairs during a given age. 
A. INFORMATION WARFARE REVOLUTION 
Today, many1 feel that the world is on the leading edge of one of these periodic 
changes in the fundamental conduct of war-that we are in the midst of a so-called 
Military-Technological Revolution (MTR) which may be causing a Revolution in Military 
1 Including Dr. Andrew Marshall of the DoD's Office of Net Assessment and several Russian military 
leaders (Kraus, September 1995). 
1 
Affairs2 (RMA). The technological changes underpinning this modem RMA consist 
primarily of the stunning advances in electronic and information technology, which in tum 
are complemented by gains in the precision, range and lethality of conventional weapons 
(Krepinevich, Summer 1994). But beyond merely enhancing how we have conducted war 
in the past, many argue that a new form of warfare-often called information warfare-is 
now possible. 
As the military moves into information warfare, advances in electronic and 
information technology are only the first step in fulfilling an information warfare RMA. 
Such military revolutions can be considered to have four primary elements, each of which 
must occur in order to achieve an RMA. These elements are: 
• Technological Change 
• Systems Development 
• Operational Innovation 
• Organizational Adaptation 
(Krepinevich, Falll994) 
Thus new technology can lead to the development, acquisition and fielding of new 
weapons, which in conjunction with new operational and organizational concepts of war, 
can result in basic changes in the conduct of war (Barnett). For the information warfare 
revolution, much of the focus has rightly been on assessing the doctrinal, operational and 
organizational issues. But less attention has been paid to the specific impacts of information 
warfare on technology research and acquisition activities. Given the ongoing clamor about 
the inadequacy of DoD acquisition and the continual call for acquisi.tion reform, one must 
. wonder if the research and acquisition systems are correctly postured to "win the IW RMA'' 
2See Andrew F. Krepinevich in "Cavalry to Computer, The Pattern of Military Revolutions," The National 
Interest, Fall 1994, for a good sketch of previous revolutions in military affairs. 
2 
(Christian, et al., May 1995)? Since if information warfare capabilities cannot be 
effectively3 researched, developed and acquired, the U.S. may not realize the full potential 
of the information warfare RMA or completely develop its information warfare capabilities. 
In order to ensure the U.S. does "win" the IW RMA, a group of Air Command and 
Staff College students have called for a revolution in acquisition affairs to "keep pace with 
the current information revolution and the IW RMA." Similar to the steps listed above for a 
revolution in military affairs, a revolution in acquisition affairs would consist of progress in 
three different areas: technology, organization, and doctrine (policy and/or process). This 
thesis will explore some of the issues in these three areas in an attempt to investigate the 
implications for acquisition affairs as a key part of the information warfare revolution in 
military affairs. (Christian, et al., May 1995) 
B. RESEARCH FOCUS 
As mentioned above, the primary research focus of this thesis is on examining the 
impacts of information warfare on the acquisition system. To further guide this 
investigation, a series of subsidiary research questions have been 'formulated. The first 
three questions are designed to provide background on the nature of information warfare 
and context for the remaining questions. The last three questions specifically probe aspects 
of the impact of information warfare on acquisition affairs. The specific subsidiary 
questions are: 
3What is "effective" development relates to how quickly and cheaply one can put a suitable and 
operationally useful system in the hands of the warfighter. But it is also tied to how well one does development 
in relation to potential opponents. 
3 
• What are the characteristics of infonnation warfare? 
• What are the technologies of infonnation warfare? 
• What are implications of dependence on commercial infonnation technologies? 
• What are the future technologies of infonnation warfare and how should research 
be directed to support infonnation warfare? 
• What organizational changes might be required in the acquisition community? 
• What changes might be required in the acquisition process? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will consist of a discovery and examination o~ information warfare 
acquisition issues. This discovery will primarily take place through the use of a modified 
Delphi4 discussion, along with personal interviews with information warfare experts and 
through examination of literature in disciplines bearing on information warfare issues. 
1. Information Warfare Delphi 
The purpose of the Delphi conducted in support of this research is to facilitate a 
discussion on the impact of information warfare on the development and acquisition of DoD 
infonnation warfare capabilities. This particular Delphi was somewhat modified from the 
typical Delphi methodology. First, interaction among the participants occurred only via 
electronic mail. This was done primarily because it enabled a very diverse group of 
individuals to participate in the Delphi effort independent of normal time and location 
considerations. While more convenient for the participants, this approach also has the 
4The Delphi method is a research technique originally developed by the RAND Corporation as a structured 
way to bring together a group of experts to examine and brainstorm on a particular issue (Linstone, 1975). 
4 
drawback of not being very interactive. Second, unlike a more standard Delphi, there was 
no attempt to drive participants to consensus on any given issue. The purpose was more to 
elicit a wide range of responses and ideas-not to develop a single answer. There was also 
no ranking or scoring of responses and no statistical analysis of the inputs. Thus this 
approach may more correctly be termed a "multi-party interview" or perhaps a "Delphic" 
approach. But for the sake of clarity and brevity, this particular modified application of the 
Delphi research technique will be referred to as the "Information Warfare Delphi." 
a. Participants 
Delphi participants came from a variety of backgrounds, although each has 
some interest or expertise in information warfare. The group included active duty military 
members, DoD civilians, authors and corporate officials. The individualss shown in Table I 
participated as members of the Delphi. 
5Ranks, organizations and positions are current as of when the Delphi was conducted. 
5 
!Name Organization Remarks 
Col. (Ret.) Al Campen Manager, AFCEA International editor of The First Information War 
Press 
V Adm Arthur Cebrowski, USN Joint Staff Director, J-6 
Peter Cochrane British Telecom Director, British Telecom Research Lab 
Dr. Fred Cohen Management Analytics author of Protection and Security on the 
Information Superhighway 
James Dunnigan Author author of Digital Soldiers 
LCDR(N) Robert Garigue Director Intelligence, Security and Deputy Program Director, Joint and 
Operations Automation, Canada Strategic Information Systems 
Dr. Fred Giessler National Defense University Information Warfare Course Director 
BG David Gust, USA US Army Program Executive Officer, Intelligence 
and Electronic Warfare 
James Hazlett SAIC Senior Analyst 
Ken King Digital Equipment Corporation Director, External Research Group 
Dr. Fred Levien Naval Postgraduate School Chairperson, Information Warfare 
Academic Group 
Dr. Martin Libiclci National Defense University author of What is Information Warfare? 
CDR Michael Loescher, USN Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary Director, Information Warfare 
of the Navy (C41/IW) 
Larry Merritt Air Force Information Warfare Technical Director 
Center 
Dr. David Probst Concordia University Professor of Computer Science 
Winn Schwartau Interpact author of Information Warfare: Chaos on 
the Electronia Superhighway 
Robert Steele Open Source Solutions CEO 
Col. David Todd, USAF USAF/XOX'f Chief of Technical Plans 
Table I. Delphi Participants 
6 
b. Approach 
Three rounds of exchanges between the participants were conducted. Each 
round started with the presentation of the round topics created by the moderator. Each 
individual then sent their responses back to the moderator, who compiled all the replies and 
transmitted the consolidated responses to each participant for their review and further 
comment (if desired). Note that participants had complete freedom to address only those 
questions they were interested in or felt comfortable answering. Round topics were 
designed to match the subsidiary research questions and included more detailed issues and 
questions that will be discussed further in later chapters. 
c. Synthesis of Results 
The raw responses to the Delphi discussion were examined, common 
threads were extracted and serious differences highlighted. Then additional commentary 
was added as necessary to bring in other issues and considerations, as well as to draw 
conclusions from the author's viewpoint. 
2. Personal Interviews 
Personal interviews were conducted with several organizations and individuals 
involved in information warfare. In particular, interviews were held with Col. Ken Allard 
7 
of the National Defense University, CDR Mike Loescher of the Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for C41/IW, Capt. Mike McCarthy of HQ USAFIINXI, 
members of Rome Lab's information warfare team, and the Air Force Electronic Systems 
Center's information warfare program office. 
3. Literature Review 
Both official government and existing open source literature on information warfare 
was studied for applicability to this thesis. In addition, material on topics related to the 
various aspects of information warfare were consulted as required. Periodicals, books, 
briefs and papers examined are shown in the attached list of references. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapters II, III and IV cover the first three subsidiary research questions and 
contain material designed to probe the general nature of information warfare, as well as 
several specific aspects of the technical nature of information warfare. These chapters set 
the stage and provide context for following chapters. Chapters V, VI and Vll present the 
results for the last three research questions and move into an exploration of some of the 
possible technology, organization and policy implications of infon:riation warfare for the 
research, development and acquisition system. Chapter vm concludes the thesis with a 
brief summary and some concluding thoughts. 
8 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMATION WARFARE 
The beginning of wisdom is calling things by their right names. 
- Confucious 
In the last few years Information Warfare has become a widely discussed topic 
within the Department of Defense and in the civilian world. But anytime you wish to have 
meaningful discussion on a particular issue, it is vital to have some common terms of 
reference. Such terms serve as a lingua franca and provide a convenient way to converse 
using shared concepts. Without such terms, communication is often difficult and consensus 
even more problematic. Such is the situation with information warfare. Although most 
everyone uses the term and many have proposed (differing) definitions for information 
warfare, there is little agreement about the specifics of the term. Alternative terms I such as 
cyberwar, netwar, information-based war, knowledge-based war, command and control 
warfare, information age war, etc., while possibly more precise, have not yet caught on in 
general use. So it has proven difficult to settle on one technically, doctrinally, and 
politically correct definition for information warfare. Instead it may be useful to approach 
the issue obliquely by discussing the unique aspects of information warfare by collecting 
observations from diverse viewpoints. Thus this chapter attempts to uncover the key 
1 The proliferation of alternative terms is itself troublesome and is reminiscent of the expansion of C2 
(Command & Control) to C3 (Command, Control & Communications) to C3I (Command, Control, 
Communications & Intelligence) to C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence) to 
cxiY. In an article titled "Cl Catharsis", Greg Todd makes light of this by referring to "C27E: command, 
control, communications, computers, cohesion, counterintelligence, cryptanalysis, conformance, collaboration, 
conceptualization, correspondence, camaraderie, commissaries, camouflage, calculators, cannon, caissons, 
canteens, canoes, catapults, carpetbaggers, caddies, carabineers, carrier pigeons, corn whiskey, camp followers, 
calamine lotion, etc." (Todd, 1986) 
9 
features of information warfare and will serve as a basis of refere1;1ce for discussions in 
future chapters. To address this issue, a series of four questions were put to the Delphi 
participants. These questions were designed to draw out opinions about the essential nature 
of information war, while at the same time avoiding hair-splitting discussions or rote 
regurgitation of various official definitions. 
A. DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS 
The first question asks about the defining characteristics of information warfare. 
While perhaps a deceptively simple query, the underlying purpose was to elicit discussion 
on the unique factors of information warfare. What makes this type of warfare different 
from, say, the characteristics of maneuver warfare or attrition warfare? 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] What are the defining characteristics of information warfare? 
[Campen] The risk in seeking a definition is the temptation to look for correlation with 
the past, rather than defining differences. I have seen definitions of IW [Information 
Warfare] that are useless because they encompass all human endeavor. I argue that the 
definition of IW must be severely circumscribed if it is to be useful in assessing the 
impact on policy, doctrine, functions and organization on civil or military. We must seek 
out what is different from the past. I submit that difference is dependency upon vulnerable 
electronic technology. I limit IW to information (data) in electronic form and the hardware 
and software by which it is created, modified, stored, processed and moved about. The 
defming characteristics are dependency upon and vulnerability of electronic information 
systems. Example: Psyops [Psychological Operations] conducted via printed leaflets is 
not IW, but radio broadcasts or the electronic manipulation of TV images is. The physical 
destruction of a telephone exchange is not IW (telegraph lines were cut in the Civil War 
and submarine cables in WW One), but disabling a switch with a virus is IW. 
[Cebrowski] The underlying character of information warfare is the proliferation of 
information-based technologies and their associated impact on society and by extension, 
on the bedrock issues of national security in the modern age. In warfighting, 
information-based technologies transcend the target sets of information, information-based 




[Cocbrane] The defining characteristic in information warfare is when information (in 
ANY form, so that includes ideas and philosophies) is supplied, or obstructed, with the 
aim of causing the information user to make a bad decision, or to confuse/overload their 
communication or decision making processes. 
Examples: 
- Knowing what your enemy does not 
- Confusing the enemy with false information 
- Damaging the information capability access of the opponent or denying him access to 
his own information 
-jamming of communications 
- hacking computer systems and changing or deleting data 
- Interception of communications 
- Use of disinformation 
-propaganda 
- cultural inftltration 
[Cohen] The broadest common definition I have been able to get together is: Conflict in 
which information or information technology is the weapon, the target, the objective, or 
the method. From now on, I will use IT to indicate "information. or information 
technology." 
[Dunnigan] Attacking and defending the ability to transmit information. 
[ Garigue] The first thing that comes to mind is the realization that information warfare is 
· a consequence. of a new and emerging SocioTech structure. This emergence is not 
homogeneous throughout the world. Where as some Western societies are moving rapidly 
into it, others have not yet started. Modem societies are all presently engaged in building 
and riding a glass highway. With this in mind we have to face the fact that more and more 
of our social, economic, political and cultural transactions are digital in nature and all of 
them are computer mediated. Which meansthat in an information society no meaningful 
event can happen between individuals or organizations without computers and networks. 
We will have to fulfill our human interactions and commitments through our 
computerized social networks. We presently, and naively, place a lot of trust in these 
computer intermediaries that tell us the state of our complex systems. These systems may 
be cities, financial markets, health, wealth, production or even distribution. All these 
SocioTech systems are subject to computer control. Computerized networks bridge 
Decision Makers with an ever increasing array of sensors and effectors"that monitor and 
intercede for us and help us in governing our complex environments. This trend will 
continue accelerating wherever efficiencies in systems can be found. As with a human 
constructed artifact there are flaws, failings and limitations. These new efficient networked 
SocioTech societies are also, and will always be flawed. Control over these systems is 
not more direct and local. Now it is remote and distributed. In open societies, authority to 
control is conferred by groups onto individuals via legitimate processes in accordance with 
common values and beliefs. But groups whose goals differ and whose objectives are at 
odds will try to impose control by force of arguments or might. So now in computer 
mediated societies as control has been somewhat centralized within the network layer, we 
see that there will be a clash of wills for control of that logical space. The fight for 
control of that space is called information warfare. 
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[Giessler] Competing and conflicting information, control and communication in complex 
adaptive systems-which all have teleological goals with the ultimate being 
survival ... All systems are involved in information warfare--the only question is do they 
do anything about it? They can be a passive or active player. IW is all about decisions and 
the use of information, energy and material resources to offset disturbances that may drive 
your system away from the attainment of its objectives-especially the one about 
survival. 
[Gust] Definition-after two years of discussion, the Army's TRADOC [Training and 
Doctrine Command] published FM 100-6, Information Operations. We argued and 
discussed the definition and who is in charge, even sought and rejected OSD [Office of the 
Secretary of Defense] staff advice on the definition. I do not believe there is universal 
agreement on it yet. 
[Hazlett] Information Warfare is conflict between parties where information, or 
information systems are used to attack and defeat the enemy or when the enemy's use of, 
or access to, information is attacked. 
[King] Information Warfare is a conflict between two parties where information 
technology is the primary means of obtaining a defensive or offensive advantage. 
[Levien] One of the most critical of these is the fact that it is so imprecise. It obliterates 
any of the past definitional boundaries of "what is an act of war?", "what is war?", "who 
is the enemy?", "where or which is the enemies' territory or country of national origin?" · 
This now much more difficult assessment of responsibility places new limits on how the 
military can react against a perceived threat to the country. In fact it becomes painfully 
difficult to determine an allowable course of action for a military officer to take when be 
(or she) is faced with the enormous body of U.S. law that (rightfully) limits and restricts 
those actions that the military can take against U.S. citizens. In today's world these same 
U.S. citizens are inextricably coupled via communications, business association, 
commercial activity, and just plain vanilla personal interactions with foreign 
(international?) entities ... both friendly and often hostile as well. This can and most often 
does present a legal NIGHTMARE for the average military officer to sort out what 
actions be is permitted to take in this IW environment. 
[Libicki] information warfare is any activity motivated by the need to alter the 
information streams going to the other side and protect one's own. These range from 
physical and radio-electronic attack on both systems and sensors (or associated support 
systems), to cryptography, attacks on computers, and psychological operations. 
[Loescher] What is new is that information creates and splinters the battle space, enables 
and defmes the killing zone, and provides the means to execute the principles of war. I 
prefer to call this "war in the info age", which I think is a genuine revolution. In Navy, 
the term info warfare is being used evolutionarily by some communities to preserve and 
improve the past-better EW [Electronic Warfare], better cryptology, better, etc. 
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. 
. [Merritt] This is a good question. These days, there is a lot of press being given to 
equating IW to network attack (offensive and defensive). In my view, this is a very narrow 
interpretation and really is not doing the community justice in really working the 
problem. I think this is why we are now seeing more reference to other terms such as info 
dominance or info operations. In my view, IW consists of any action to exploit or affect 
an adversary's ability to gain a true picture of the battle space or to execute command and 
control of their forces. Also includes all the same activities associated with protecting our 
own capabilities. This truly brings in all aspects of mv, network attack, node analysis, 
intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, etc., both terrestrial and space based. This 
broad interpretation has been the cause of much controversy that has crossed traditional 
ricebowls and caused the community to concentrate on particular aspects of the problem. 
[Probst] Information-based warfare is that branch of warfare information technology that 
supports two basic pillars of the Revolution in Military Affairs, viz., (i) Dominant 
Battlespace Knowledge, and (ii) Integrated Battlespace Management, including pre-
engagement battlespace preparation, precision force (including just-in-time strike), and 
precision logistics. To be effective, these pillars require major advances in modelling and 
simulation, which in turn require (i) advanced control theory for automated full-spectrum 
strategic decision making, precision scheduling, and other information functions, and (ii) 
high-performance data assimilation and analysis for data-intensive predictive modelling 
and simulation. 
Because it relies on high-performance computers and communications, Information-Based 
Warfare can be disrupted. Defensive Information Warfare tries to make sure that this 
cannot happen to our forces. Offensive Information Warfare-about which I have some 
reservations-tries to disrupt the computer-and-communications-based C4ISR [Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] of 
the adversary. 
Definitions aside, we can see three embryos of Warfare Information Technology today. 
These are: 
- total situational awareness -> Integrated Battlespace Management 
- network security=> Defensive Infonnation Warfare 
- the USAF Captain, using SIPRNET [Secret Internet Protocol Router Network], who 
subverted the Navy's Atlantic Fleet command in September 1995 ==> Offensive 
Information Warfare 
The following is an equivalent vanilla base line for Information Warfare:· 
- high-performance information-based warfare with dominant battlespace knowledge, and 
precision force-including offensive information warfare-will alter the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of war (i.e., it will change the appearance of combat) 
- information infrastructures are now part of the logistics tails of all armed forces, and-as 
such-require careful defense 
- conversely, one may consider degrading the information systems that enhance the 
military capabilities of the adversary 
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[Schwartau] I maintain that True Information Warfare is the use of information and 
information systems as weapons against target information and information systems. I 
eliminate the call for or use of any bombs or bullets in True Info War. IW can attack 
individuals, organizations or nation-states (or spheres of influence) through a wide variety 
of techniques: 
- Confidentiality compromise 
- Integrity attacks 
- Denial of Service 
- Psyops 
- Dis/mis-information, media, etc. 
Most clearly, though, the distinctive feature of Pure IW is that it can so easily be waged 
against a civilian infrastructure in contrast to a military one. This is a new facet of war, 
where the target may well be the economic national security of an adversary. In addition, 
though, we have distributed capability to wage war. Today, a small band of antagonists 
can launch an IW offensive from behind their desks thousands of miles away; or a group 
of U.S. hackers might choose to declare war on another country, independent of any 
official U.S. sanction. The capabilities of IW is the issue: how much havoc can I rain 
without resorting to bombs and bullets. A lot is the answer, and I'm not the only smart 
guy on the planet. 
[Steele] The defming characteristics of information are: 
-Connectivity (all mediums) 
-Content 
- Coordination (standards, procurement) 
- Communications & Computational security 
-Context (both cultural and substantive) 
Information "warfare" is almost moot or an oxymoron. In this era, failing to be 
competitive in optimizing the above five aspects of information is tantamount to 
abdication. At a very simplistic level information warfare can be thought of as an attack 
on any of the above five elements (e.g., denial of service or corruption of content). On the 
defensive side, again at a simplistic level, it can be considered in terms of continuity of 
operations. Unfortunately, our own DoD will never be a -serious IW player until they 
figure out that collecting information, and the sensor to shooter interface, is the heart of 
information-based warfare operations. 
[Todd] With warfare in the information age, our ability to control and exploit the 
information battlespace will be as much an enabling factor in combined warfare as the 
ability to control and exploit the air and space battlespace to enable conventional 
combined terrestrial warfare in the industrial age. Note that I don't use the term 
"information warfare." The challenge of warfare in the information age is more pervasive 
than the commonly thought of niches of information warfare. But within this category of 
IW falls our capabilities to attack an adversary's information function (regardless of 
means), the protection of our information junctions (regardless of means), and that IW is 
a means, not an end. 
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2. Commonalities and Differences 
First, it is clear that most Delphi participants agreed that much of the current ado 
about information warfare is related to the exploding capabilities of information technology. 
Rapidly expanding dependence on information technologies, both in society at large and in 
the military, is creating a situation where sometimes vulnerable information processing, 
flows and stores2 can be attacked to gain military advantage. But here is where divergence 
starts to occur. Some felt that the focus should be on information technology itself as the 
method of information war. This case posits that only attacking your enemy with "non-
physical" information technology-based methods constitutes true information warfare. 
Under this view, bombing an early warning radar would not be information war. While 
using malicious software to confuse the radar would be information war, even though the 
results in both instances might be the same. 
Most participants, however, expanded the scope of information warfare to focus 
more generically on the concept of information itself. As historians are fond of pointing 
out, attacking an adversary's information functions is not really new and is not necessarily 
waged with information technologies. What is important is not the form in which the 
information is processed, stored or transmitted (it can be in a computer, in a brain or on a 
wax-sealed parchment), but somehow attacking the actual content of the information. Nor 
is it important how the information was attacked. Thus from this view dropping leaflets to 
impact the mind of a frontline Iraqi soldier would be considered information warfare just as 
much as high-tech radio broadcasts aimed at that same soldier. 
2The term "information function" will be used to refer to infomiation processes, flows and stores. 
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Implicit in all of this is the idea that we must protect our own information functions 
from exploitation and attack (commonly referred to as defensive information warfare). 
Most of the discussion in this area has been related to protecting our own networks and 
computer systems. Not much has been said about protecting information in other forms. 
For example, how should the U.S. protect its own frontline soldiers from propaganda? 
Lastly, there were several unique views that merit further examination. One view is 
that information warfare constitutes any action which degrades the capability of the enemy 
commander's picture of the battle and prevents him from exercising effective command and 
control. This flavor of information warfare is called Command and Control Warfare (C2W) 
and has been initially designated as the military's battlefield implementation of information 
warfare (CJCS MOP 30, 1993). This is much more restrictive than the other definitions in 
that only the commander's information functions are targeted. 
Another concept raised by one of the participants brings to mind the theory of 
reflexive control. Largely developed by the ~ussians, reflexive control involves the idea of 
trying to feed information to influence an opponent to voluntarily rea~h a certain conclusion 
or decision that is helpful to one's own cause. At the sanie time, the opponent is trying to 
do something comparable to friendly forces. If one thinks of information warfare as dealing 
with such "competing cybernetic systems," then this combination of reflexive control 
systems would be a "subsystem of information war." (Giessler, July.l993) 
A final perspective expressed is that information warfare is simply a result of a 
"new and emerging Sociotech structure." This structure is characterized by the use of 
information technology to facilitate the day-to-day transactions of society and by the use of 
information technology to track the status of complex social and economic systems. Power 
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and control in such a Sociotech structure would be more diffuse and distributed and would 
reside within the network layer. The fight for control of the Sociotech structure via the 
network would be called information warfare. 
B. INFORMATION IN WAR VERSUS INFORMATION WAR 
The next issue addressed by the Delphi group deals with the distinctions between 
the use of "information in war'' and information warfare. What separates the two ideas? Are 
they really different? This question aims to further circumscribe information warfare by 
comparing and contrasting these two concepts. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Are "information in war'' and information warfare the same? 
[Campen] Definitely not. Information-in-war describes how information has been used 
since the dawn of conflict: Always sought, usually too late or wrong, not always properly 
used or effective when used. Information-in-war was serendipitous and usually incidental 
to the conflict. It was an adjunct to war, with an impact varying from nil to absolutely 
vital in rare, notable incidents. In IW, if there is no information there may well be no 
war. Example: Smart missiles but no means to instruct them, or the XXI [Force XXI] 
Soldier who's GPS [Global Positioning System] fails, is lost, and. cannot perform 
assigned function, or "just-in-time" logistics that aren't. 
[Cebrowski] No. The premise of information in war involves the process by which raw 
data (sensors or intel sources) is converted to information for decision-makers, and how 
that information is distributed and acted upon by operational commanders. Information 
warfare is the means by which we affect information in war. This can be done by 
targeting an adversary's information, information-based processes, information systems or 
computer-based networks. Equally important is protecting our own information, 
information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks. 
[Cochrane] Information is a tool and a target of war Gust like a tank or a munitions 
factory). Information in war includes details about the enemy (his strengths, weaknesses, 
deployment, location of resources, communications). Information warfare is using 
information technology, either to gain data about the enemy or to destroy the enemy's 
data resources or cultural support. 
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[Cohen] Not in my view. Information in war includes every .aspect of IT as applied during 
conflict. IW includes only situations where IT is the weapon, target, objective, or 
method. For example, supporting warfighting with mapping and weather information is 
not IW except in the cases where the mapping information is the weapon, target, 
objective, or method of conflict. In ancillary roles, it's not part of IW. In this view, every 
piece of IT may sometimes be part of IW, but most parts are never part of IW. In other 
words, it is the "USE" of IT and not some inherent property ofthe IT that applies. 
[Dunnigan] No. The former is a product, the latter is an action. 
[Garigue] The distinction is akin to looking at the subject that performs the action or the 
object on which we act. These are different approaches to the same subject. Although 
many would see them as different I see them as being a continuum. From the meta-
strategical aspects of Information Warfare we see what we are trying to achieve, such as 
looking at the objectives and the criteria by which we determine if we have achieved them 
or not. Information in war relates to the managerial aspects of how to do it. So 
Information Warfare help us to focus on effectiveness issues and Informa_tion in War helps 
us focus on efficiency issues. But the two cannot be separated from each other and need to 
be considered as a two sides of a same coin. 
[Giessler] No-the DSB [Defense Science Board] concept from the '94 summer study was 
valuable. I in W is the use of information technologies to better conduct what we 
traditionally know as modem warfare and the Tofflers would call warfare in the industrial 
wave. In this mode information is a supporting element to air, land, sea, space and SOF 
[Special Operations Forces] warfare. It is a force multiplier. IW is warfare in the 
information realin, environment and age. It includes old but also new forms and qualities 
of warfare-the fight for survival. It is facilitated by IW technologies that create a unique 
confluence that allow competition and conflict never before considered. And we are about 
as smart about what that warfare is as Billy Mitchell was about air warfare and power in 
1917 when he was teaching and thinking about it at Langley Field. 
[Gust] Info in war can mean the Blue Force use of info while info warfare means, to me, 
both Blue Force protection actions of their info while offensively exploiting the Red 
Force's info. 
[Hazlett] No, many forms of information are used in war, not all of which is used in 
information warfare. In information warfare, information is the weapon and/or the target 
[King] No. All participants in a war have always made use of any available information 
but it was always in support of the primary operations. 
[Levien] "Information in war" and "information warfare" are poles apart in meaning. (Ah 
the beauty of the English language!) Information in war .. .is essentially a meaningless 
phrase in that it adds very little to the concept of the role information plays in wartime as 
opposed to any other time in the affairs of man. On the other hand ... coining the new term 
"information warfare" ... where information is the descriptive term of war ... implies a new 
dimension of how to wage war, which is as highly distinct as the term (for example) 
Nuclear War. The potential effects of IW, while not as physically dramatic as nuclear, 
could nevertheless in the future be as historically significant as nuclear war in its 
resulting outcome. 
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[Libicki] Information in warfare is so broad a category as to be meaningless; what kind of 
warfare does not involve information? 
[Loescher] See above. 
[Merritt] I don't think so. Info in war as I see is that info that allows you execute your 
mission. This is needed in whatever conflict that we are involved in, whatever realm we 
are operating (i.e., space, air, land, info). Info war is the utilization of the info realm to 
gain advantage in wartime. 
[Probst] Information In War has an elementary and an advanced stage. In the elementary 
stage, data is converted into information for use by experienced decision makers; in the 
advanced stage, viz., integrated battlespace management, computer systems generate and 
evaluate alternate warplanning scenarios using modelling and simulation technology. 
Information Warfare concerns the protection or disruption of this process. 
[Schwartau] Absolutely not. I consider information in war to be making conventional 
weapons more efficient; to bring better information to the HQ [Headquarters], process it 
better and faster, and get the necessary information out. to the war fighter as fast as 
possible. The closer to real time and iterative the process is, the better. This approach 
makes wars less bloody, increases efficiency and maximizes the capabilities of the 
existing arsenals. What I find intriguing about this thought model is that is the same 
paradigm for commercial companies, except for the bullets, which makes it in their case 
closer to a Class II style information war. 
-Market research 
- Competitive analysis 
- Decision making 
-Sales/Marketing efforts 
-Feedback 
The convergence of military and commercial IW issues is obvious, at least to me. :-) 
[Steele] See above. "Information in peace", or information peacekeeping, is the flip side. 
Where we have a major disconnect today is in the existing bureaucraf:ic mind-sets and 
forms of organization. The battlefield is civil, but no civilian organization is ready to get 
organized, and the military is saying "it's not my job" to provide for the common defense 
of the civil sector ... 
[Todd] Military history has multiple examples of how "Information in war" is often the 
leveraging factor in successful engagements and campaigns. But the common thread is 
that engagements were necessary to impose one's will upon the enemy. At the other end 
of the pendulum, information warfare is viewed along the lines ofToffler and Schwartau 
in which one can impose one's will upon an adversary through the control, manipulation 
and denial of information, similar to the Soviet theory of "reflexive control." A more 
useful notion is that of information-based warfare. This falls in between those two 
extremes. Not only is the advantages of information technology realized through the 
abilities to engage the adversary with less friendly forces but having overwhelming 
impact due to timing and targeting, but in information-based warfare we can integrate 
military disciplines to manipulate the adversary's perceptions at the tactical, operational 
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and strategic levels. Information-based warfare, consistent with previously accepted 
operational art, will still require changes in organization, technology adaptation, and 
changes in operational concepts and doctrine. · 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
There was clear consensus that "information in war'' and information warfare are 
not the same-although both may make use of information technologies. Better 
"information in war'' can be used to enhance conventional warfare tasks such as movement, 
fixing, command & control, targeting, striking, logistics, etc. Under this view, using a 
computer to automate resupply of tank parts is not information warfare but is improved 
logistics. Nor are the F-22 or Comanche information warfare platforms no matter how 
many microprocessors are in them. It is the purpose for which we use information 
technology and not just the simple use of information technology that defines whether it is 
"information in war'' or information warfare. The use of information to enhance our own 
operations is thus different from protecting our information functions or attacking our 
adversary's information functions (the latter two activities constitute information war). 
Admiral Cebrowski sums up the group's thinking very nicely when he states that 
"information warfare is the means by which we affect information in war." 
C. REFLECTIONS ON CYBERSPACE 
There is much talk about "cyberspace" or the "infosphere" in discussions about 
information warfare. Many contend cyberspace is a new realm of struggle and contention 
on a co-equal status with the more traditional realms of air, land, sea and space. This 
question attempts to explore whether cyberspace is in fact a new domain of warfare. 
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1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Is "cyberspace" a new medium (like the traditional media of 
air, land, sea and space) of competition and conflict between nations, 
businesses and other organizations? 
[Campen] No. Land, sea. air (and perhaps space someday) are media where physical things 
(people, ships and aircraft) interact. If cyberspace means the ether, then it does not qualify 
because no conflict actually takes places in that media. If cyberspace is defined as 
including the physical devices mentioned above (computers, communications, etc.), then 
it does not qualify because those devices are being employed in one or more of the 
existing media (air, land, sea), not in the ether. 
[Cebrowski] Cyberspace is more of a cliche than a medium. A medium implies that 
definitive boundaries or characteristics exist-cyberspace is too ubiquitous to be bounded, 
and thus, shouldn't be considered a medium. 
[Cochrane] Information is a commodity of war, like food and fuel. Cyberspace is a new 
transport mechanism and hence a target like a road. Cyberspace covers sea, land and air 
with its transport mechanisms. The fact that the Internet is accessible by anyone from 
anywhere in the world means that machines attached to the net are under threat of attack 
from unfriendly machines which are also connected. 
[Cohen] New? Not really. Separate and different? It may be advantageous to treat it that 
way. 
[Dunnigan] Only new in terms of much greater mass and velocity. 
[Garigue] Cyberspace is not a physical space but a true social space. Unlike the other 
mediums where geography and physics structures relationships of force, in Cyberspace 
only information and knowledge determines the structure of power. Distances, geography, 
and borders become artificial and abstract notions and do not regulate the relationships 
between individuals and organizations. There are no inherent constraints in Cyberspace 
(except bandwidth and IP [Internet Protocol] addresses but this is not seen as a major 
source of future conflict) so there is no real reason to fight for possession of something 
that has no space or territory. However, the fact that this domain can amplify perspectives 
and thus exert influence over Decision Makers as well as potentially control systems that 
can acquire, transmit, store, analyze and produce wealth, there is certairtlY a danger of a 
clash of goals. 
[Giessler] It is a new realm of conflict and competition that has evolved since the mid 
1800s. But the advent of the chip, satellite corns and sensing, fiber optics and 
technological advances in software, hardware, orgware, brainware, decisionware, etc. have 
created changes which have resulted in a discontinuous function and reality. 
[Gust] Cyberspace, like frequency spectrum, will become a nationally controlled asset. 
Due to access via various means, i.e., direct satellite, phone lines over. land, fiber optic 
cables undersea, etc., it will be hard to control. Use now precedes policy. 
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[Hazlett] Yes, it has boundaries similar to those between other mediums and 
environments, across which attacks can be mounted either physically or electronically. 
[King] "Cyberspace" is a new medium of communications with its own set of 
characteristics. Commerce will become the primary medium of competition and conflict 
and the most likely target of electronic attacks. 
[Levien] Cyberspace is a concept of a state that exists only in the mind's eye. It has no 
physical properties, no dimensions ... nothing to touch ... or feel. This as opposed to land, 
sea, atmosphere, etc., which can be described with physical constants and dimensions and 
to which the Laws of Physics (immutable as they are) can be applied thus allowing us to 
predict their behavior. Not possible with Cyberspace. So if you can't describe it...and you 
can't predict it, it's hard to protect yourself from it. You can perhaps try to change the 
effects which it produces, but that is another matter altogether. 
[Libicki] Unlike all other media, there is no such thing as forced entry in cyberspace. 
[Loescher] Potentially. But Clausewitz has to be reexamined in our age. War is only an 
extension of politics if there is a discernable politic. I don't think the medium is 
inherently a medium of competition and conflict But it probably will become so like the 
others. It's probably better to think of information as a competitive topic than of 
cyberspace this way-although cyberspace is definitely a new medium the prime 
characteristics of which are virtuality (i.e., independent of time and space) 
[Merritt] In my view, yes. Many contend it is nothing new but just an extension of old 
capabilities. I disagree. The ability to quickly gain access to data, systems, etc., anywhere 
in the world within seconds is a leap of capability that is just now being utilized. In my 
view, we have barely scratched the surface ofthis capability. In this "virtual world" a 
whole new methodology with new tactics, new laws, new players, and new results tends 
to support the argument that this is indeed new and until we get true buy-in on this issue, 
the true capabilities of IW will not be realized. 
[Probst] If it is possible to attack across cyberspace, and to achieve cyberspace dominance, 
then we would have to call it a new medium. I think this is an exaggeration. What is 
feasible is to have an order-of-magnitude competitive advantage in both battlespace 
knowledge--which implies understanding-and integrated battlespace management. Your 
question then becomes secondary. 
[Schwartau] Hell yes! If I have the ability to raise havoc with an Army or Navy or Air 
Force, and I exclusively use cyber-weapons, then of course it's an added dimension. The 




- mind screwing 
I believe we need a center of IW excellence, yes, perhaps an independent force, which 
houses all of the expertise, and then is appropriately distributed as needed to other services 
as required. This "Cyber-Force" (I don't have a better name yet) can act on it's own 
without conventional service aid, or in combinations with others. 
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[Steele] An old medium with a new importance. Especially troubling because of the 
stealth and anonymity that any individual can exploit. Has radically altered the balance of 
power between nations, organizations, and individuals, and left all intelligence 
communities two decades behind the learning curve. 
[Todd] "In many respects, one can consider information asa realm, just as land, sea, air, 
and space are realms. "Realm as defined as: the region, sphere, or domain within which 
anything occurs, prevails, or dominates. "Information has its own characteristics of 
motion, mass, and topography, just as air, space sea and have their own distinct 
characteristics. There are strong conceptual parallels between conceiving of air and 
information as realms." {Cornerstones of Information Warfare, Sep 95}. Just as air and 
space forces attempt to control and exploit air and space in order to enhance all military 
force's effectiveness, so to must all forces attempt to control and exploit the information 
realm to enhance all military force's effectiveness. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
Three basic views about cyberspace seem to emerge from this discussion. The first 
is that cyberspace is not a new medium of competition and conflict. It is simply an artificial 
construct of the human mind that doesn't have definitive boundaries, has no physical 
existence separate from any of the existing media, and has no real governing laws akin to 
the laws of physics in the normal physical world. 
Others took the exact opposite view, arguing that cyberspace ~ an old conflict realm 
that has gained new importance with the advent of advanced information technology. The 
growth of world-wide interconnected information systems and sensors has led to the birth 
of a "social space" which is distinguished by being independent of time and physical 
boundaries, by the ever increasing amount and velocity of information, and governed by 
the peculiar rules3 and protocols of digital technology. This viewpoint has much in 
common with the development of air warfare. Much as aerial technologies allowed one to 
exploit the realm of the air (which had always existed), information technologies allow one · 
3Qne facet of which is what Dr. Martin Libicld was talking about when he said "there is no such thing as 
forced entry in cyberspace." Unlike targets in the physical media. you cannot forcibly "take" a computer system 
in cyberspace unless there has been poor systems design or systems administration. 
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to exploit a cyberspace that has always existed, even if it hasn't been formally recognized 
as such. 
Finally, there was the view that cyberspace is really more of a transport mechanism 
than anything else. Much like a road system or the frequency spectrum, use of cyberspace 
to transport and store information will make it a natural target in war. 
In the end, no consensus was reached. What is clear is that the conditions often 
associated with cyberspace, and therefore the rules under which information warfare is 
conducted, can differ greatly from conflict in the traditional realms of war. 
D. NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN? 
King Solomon once said, "There is no new thing under the sun." Many skeptics 
and agnostics say the same thing about information warfare. This proposition was put to 
the Delphi participants in an attempt to draw out what is novel about information warfare 
and why there has been such a surge of interest in information warfare. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Is there really anything new or different about information 
warfare? 
[Campen] Defmitely. Because of dependencies and vulnerabilities of information systems, 
the potential exists to gain advantage or victory without resort to traditional means of 
force, or perhaps with fewer forces. Example: Manipulation of opponent sensor data can 
make things appear other than they are. Manipulation of opponent data could disrupt 
logistics and troop flow. (Fustest with the mostest!) when you are actually neither. 
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[Cebrowski] Although the rUJture of war will always remain constant, the character of war 
is in constant change. Information permeates society-as a pillar of national security, as 
well as the military-where the fractional component of information technology 
continues to grow in warfighting systems. U.S. dependence on information and associated 
technologies, coupled with rapidly expanding global interdependencies, exposes 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited using Jw, both here and abroad. 
[Cochrane] One potential difference for countries like the U.S. is that the battle can be 
waged with the civilian population in their own backyard from day 1. In this respect 
information warfare could represent a threat that is comparable to nuclear missiles, 
without the tell-tale sign of a missile launch. 
Important factors are: 
-Low entry barriers mean ANYONE can start a "war" 
- The speed of distribution 
- More numerous ways of going about the war 
- Harder to fmd the culprits 
-More efficient (bigger bangs for your buck!!!) 
- A success will be seen by more of your enemies 
- Inflicted damage can potentially be far higher than earlier technologies 
[Cohen] Yes. The difference is that we now depend on IT for every aspect of our existence 
as a society. This increased dependency means that the inherent vulnerabilities of IT 
extends to our ability to wage war, survive economically, and to the very fabric of our 
society. 
[Dunnigan] Greater mass and velocity. U.S. Grant standing next to a telegraph operator· 
was waging info war, but the speed of data transmission was less than 300 baud. 
[Garigue] Yes-but most of it has yet to be seen as the impact of living in an 
information society becomes real. However, the initial impact will be the rapid 
redistribution of power away from institutions that used to control simply through 
possession of information; such as intelligence organizations, government, big 
corporations, multinationals, and professional organizations. Power will come from the 
capacity to create and apply new knowledge. It is the capacity to apply new knowledge 
that will permit organizations to determine their future by simply deciding which future 
they want. 
[Giessler] Yes-much is new. The newest is that we don't know what all is new. Just as 
Billy [Mitchell] didn't know how air warfare was new we are incapable of specifying how 
IW is new. And it doesn't make any big difference. Those who can not ~low out-of-the-
box thinking will just not survive in the info age. They may be fine if they stay in the 
industrial age. They will even be needed there. IW is all about influencing minds (as Sun 
Tsu wrote about) but with new technologies and wares. 
[Gust] We have some thinking to do about jamming vs. intercept. We can now do so 
much more selective jamming and denial, and destruction because of technology. Intercept 
still provides so much Red Force intent that it must not be set aside because of our 
ability to defeat the Red info systems. 
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[Hazlett] Yes, in information warfare, information is the target, and sometimes the 
weapon. In other forms of warfare, it is generally a bi-product or collateral target, but not 
the primary medium or target. 
[King] It is different in that the experience and expertise from centuries of regular warfare 
are of very little value in information warfare. Thus it is a revolutionary change not an 
evolutionary one. 
[Levien] To answer this question you have to decide what your timeline of reference is for 
the word "NEW." When do you start in deciding what is new? In many ways IW is 
simply a repackaging of a great body of knowledge that has been around for quite some 
time. PSYOPS, deception, for example ... the world's history is replete with example after 
example of these two subjects. Ditto with the fifth "pillar" of C2W destruction. As you 
get to the subject of EW in C2W, you have a more recent series of events to consider. 
But it is clear that unlike the dawn of the nuclear age, with the discovery that e=mc2, 
there is no single defming technological breakthrough that heralded the age of Infonnation 
Warfare. There ARE some technologies that make the advance of civilization possible 
which then in turn were applied to warfare (as always) but these were not specifically 
developed for Infonnation War. What bas happened is a sort of rearranging of the chairs 
around the table of knowledge. But this is not a trivial shift. For it opens up ... no, rather 
it demands ... that the military strategist and planner consider fields of interest which 
heretofore he has been (happily) able to almost ignore. The most significant change that I 
see occurring is: 
IT REQUIRES A MUCH CLOSER COUPLING OF THE MILITARY AND DOD 
WITH THE U.S. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BASE IF WE ARE TO 
SURVIVE AS A NATION. 
This relationship in the past bas often not been a close or comfortable one, with both 
parties trying to keep the other at anns length. (With the possible exception at the height 
of large wars). And it certainly is not the general attitude of the U.S. populace at large 
these days with the desire to keep the Government more and more out of our daily lives. 
In the response to our efforts to combat the threat of IW, it may finally dawn on both 
sides of the parties to these debates, that closer ties are no longer an option. If one 
examines the actions of some of our "allies" ... e.g., France, Israel, Japan ... you can see 
these partnerships fonning with often devastating results to U.S. interests. 
[Libicki] At the operational level, as the processing of information becomes systematized 
(e.g., the systems component of the command center, Admiral Owens' System of 
Systems, the Nil [National Information Infrastructure]), attacks on and defenses of such 
systems becomes important. At the strategic level, there is nothing really new. 
[Loescher] Yes. See above. 
[Merritt] See above. I think yes ... 
[Probst] There are two new aspects, both rather obvious. Progress in high-performance 
computers and communications will lead to a Revolution in Military Affairs, although 
there are more advanced and less advanced thinkers about how this should happen. We 
depend on our computers in unprecedented ways. As cooperation gives way to contention, 
we fmd our computers have much thinner skins than we ever imagined. · 
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In brief, 
- information technology is on the point of causing a paradigm shift in information-based 
warfare 
-we may generalize counter-force to counter-information system 
[Schwartau] I keep hearing the arguments that IW is nothing new, but I have to argue that for the first time in history, the capability exists to wage a conflict (indeed a war) where 
no conventional munitions are required to achieve a stated goal; be that goal isolation, 
economic deactivation, sanctions or alternative to combat. 
[Steele] Not yet. All I see at this point is industrial age concepts applied very poorly to 
information age opportunities. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
There was almost complete consensus on this question. Most participants felt that 
the modem incarnation of information warfare is something substantially new. The main 
reason for this thinking relates to the vastly increased use of information technology in 
society at large, as well as in the military. Such use implies a dependence on information 
technology and dependence results in vulnerabilities should the use of information 
technologies be denied or otherwise int~rfered with. Attacking (or protecting) the 
vulnerabilities created by information technology use is the basis of information warfare. 
There are also some special aspects of these information techllology vulnerabilities. 
First, the interconnected nature of information technology changes the frontlines of 
warfare. No longer is the United States immune to direct non-nuclear or non-terrorist attack 
of the continental homeland. Previously the only two realistic ways to directly attack the 
United States proper were to be a superpower with intercontinental ballistic missiles or to 
be a terrorist. The former takes immense resources and the latter typically has had only 
limited effect. Information warfare requires no such immense resources· and has the 
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potential for widespread impact. This combination of direct attack with low entry cost and 
tremendous possible impact is new. 
Another new aspect involves the speed with which information warfare may take 
place. Unlike current warfare means, information warfare by nature may require no 
obvious build-up or marshalling of forces. And when attacks do take place, the speed with 
which results may occur has the potential to be very quick. 
Finally, from a more purely military standpoint, some participants stated that what 
is really unique is that information warfare gives commanders the promise of a new way to 
wage war. As the Economist states, "If information warfare means something new, it is the 
use of information as a substitute for traditional ways of fighting, rather than as an adjunct 
to them" (Economist, June 10, 1995). If this is true, then Mr. Ken King's statement that 
expertise in prior warfare does not translate to expertise in information warfare is a subject 
that bears further attention and study. 
E. SYNTHESIS 
Given the diversity of views expressed above, are there any common threads or 
integrating themes that can be drawn about information warfare? Although the Delphi 
participants in general rejected the notion that the use of "information in war" and 
information warfare are the same, the distinction is not so clear to others. For example, a 
recent article about an upgraded artillery fire control computer referred to it as an 
"information warfare system." Such discussions about the use of information and 
information technology in conflict and war have somewhat naturally led to the label of 
information warfare. The problem with this broad view is that almost every activity in war 
28 
requires information and would therefore be some form of information warfare. It is 
probably more precise to speak of information-enhanced warfare. In the information age, 
this involves the use of information technology to better accomplish normal warfare 
functions like command, control, move, find, fix, shoot, logistics, personnel management, 
etc. So "digitization of the battlefield," Dominant Battlespace Awareness and C4/ISR are 
not information warfare but information in war-even if they all indisputably entail 
information and information technology. 
What then is left for information warfare? The key is in the new and growing 
dependence on information technology-both in the military and perhaps more importantly 
in society at large. One now may be able to target and attack the information functions of 
adversaries in ways that were not possible until the widespread adoption of information 
technology. Thus attacking an enemy's information and information technology · 
vulnerabilities and protecting one's own are the essence 4 of information warfare. The new 
Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of information warfare takes this view: 
Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, 
information-based processes, information systems and computer-based networks while 
defending one's own information, information-based processes, information systems and 
computer-based networks. (NDU IBW Course Slides, March 1996) 
The emphasis is on targeting enemy information functions while protecting one's 
own-but does not include one's own use of information or information technology for the 
enhancement of various warfare purposes. Also obvious is the prominence given to 
4Deciding whether information warfare occurs in a "cyberspace" that is a co-equal realm with air, land, sea 
and space is probably not critical, as long as it is recognized that information warfare conflict has its own 
physical and logical rules and limitations that must be considered when conducting such warfare. 
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attacking and protecting information technologies such as info!ffiation systems and 
computer networks. 
One issue that remains is whether information warfare is also defined by the means 
used, by the ~ attacked or by the purpose for attacking the target. The JCS definition 
states that the purpose of information warfare is information superiority. So if one attacks a 
computer-controlled drawbridge with a virus for the purpose of "taking out'' that bridge, is 
that considered information warfare? The purpose was clearly not information superiority, 
although many would still label this an information warfare attack because of the means 
used. Likewise, disabling a tank by disrupting its microprocessors with an electro-magnetic 
pulse could be considered a "strike" via information warfare means. Thus the sole 
emphasis on information superiority may be too exclusionary. While certainly information 
superiority is a major goal of information warfare, it can be argued that more traditional 
warfare purposes can also be served by attacks on vulnerable information technology. If 
one can disrupt the adversary's warfare functions (be it C2, strike, reconnaissance, 
logistics, etc.) via attacks on the information technology that he uses to support those 
functions, then information warfare becomes one more means (as is physical destruction) 
to a particular military end (like interdiction, C2W, anti-infrastrUcture, attrition, etc.). 
Likewise, if one can disrupt some of the adversary's social or economic functions via 
attacks on the information technology that he uses to support those functions, then 
information warfare becomes one means to a particular political or diplomatic end (like 
economic blockage, isolation, etc.). 
In summary and at the risk of adding to the confusion of terms, one might break 
down the subjects of information and warfare into a simple taxonomy. At the top would be 
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"Information Age Warfare" or ''Third Wave Warfare." These terms would be comprised of 
all the aspects of modem and near-future warfare. One of the main features of Information 
Age Warfare would be "Information-Enhanced Warfare." This term recognizes the 
revolutionary impact of information technology on all of the functions of war. Another 
separate facet would be the over-worked term of "Information Warfare" as the moniker for 
attacking an enemy's information functions while protecting one's own. 
Is there now a better view of the essential elements of information warfare? The 
answer may be yes, but it is obvious that the full picture has not been revealed quite yet. 
The problem of overloading the term "information warfare" with different meanings still 
persists and is likely to for the immediate future. 
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III. TECHNOLOGY OF INFORMATION WARFARE 
The most signal contribution by Alfred Thayer Mahan in the field of military doctrine was 
his recognition that the conduct of war changes rapidly with technological advance. 
-Dale 0. Smith 
Dr. John Arquilla and Dr. David Ronfeldt argue that information warfare has been 
around since the time of Ghengis Khan (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1992). Why then all the 
recent attention? Much of the contemporary focus is related to one of the defining 
characteristics of information warfare identified in the last chapter-the stunning advances 
in information technology made in the last few decades. These advances are opening up 
new opportunities and avenues for information warfare. Since technology appears to play 
such an integral part in modem information warfare, this chapter seeks to explore the 
implications of this relationship through a series of questions put to the Delphi participants. 
These questions also set the stage for discussions of how to research and develop future 
information warfare technologies. 
A. DEPENDENT OR ENABLED? 
This question attempts to investigate whether technology is a requirement for 
waging effective information warfare or if technology is merely an amplifying factor. Does 
technology simply help to perform information warfare better or does information warfare 
depend on technology for its existence? 
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1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Is information warfare technology dependent or technology 
enabled? 
[Campen] Both. Same coin, different sides. By above definition, IW is the child of 
technology and its greatest weakness and capability. If one side is overly enabled, it can 
become overly dependent and overly vulnerable. 
[Cebrowski] Information warfare is more technology enabled since it focuses on the 
vulnerabilities and opportunities presented by the increasing dependence on information 
and information systems. However, other aspects of information warfare exist in part, 
outside the domain of technology-psychological operations and elements of intelligence 
for example. 
[Cochrane] Technology simply enables new forms of information warfare to evolve but 
with similar target end points. You used to have to print lots of leaflets and fly your 
Sopwith Camel over the enemy lines and throw them out at the population and hope 
some of them were read. Now you can swamp your enemy's TV transmitters and reach 
every household with the message. However, a well-placed bomb or missile could put pay 




[Giessler] Both-just as was air warfare and industrial warfare and maneuver warfare and 
economic warfare and media warfare and ... 
[Gust] I think technology advances are driving this doctrinal issue. We are now asking 
what can we do with a technology rather than asking what we want in a technology to 
accomplish a task. 
[Hazlett] Both, some information warfare weapons, such as viruses, trojan horses, etc., are 
products of technology and therefore technology dependent-and yet-their use is enabled 
by electronic technology. ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems are 
technologically dependent, but they also enable information attacks'by divining and 
defining an adversary's information posture. 
[King] Both. The technology enables systems to be built (very fast computers) but the 
use of them in information warfare is dependent on other technologies being in place 
(pervasive networks). 
[Libicki] What's the difference? 
[Loescher] Technology enabled, I think. There is a pattern in technological revolutions 
(e.g., oil, automobile, power industries) that begins with invention, moves through 
systemization and eventually changes the culture. That's what's happening to us now 
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(probably stage 2). But if you choose to narrowly defme the revolution in warfare brought 
about by the info age as "info warfare" then I have to say we're just doing it more 
efficiently now than in the past. The issue is not IW, which is evolutionary; but war in 
the info age, which will be revolutionary. 
[Merritt] Both. Many of the capabilities that can be used or exploited today and in the 
future are and will be dependent on technology. Who would have believed as recently as 
two years ago that we would have WWW [World-Wide Web] capabilities that could and 
will revolutionize how we do business. By the same token, it is going to require new 
technology that currently does not exist to enable us to execute IW both offensive and 
defensive. 
[Probst] I have trouble parsing this question. Clearly, we can't have a Revolution in 
Military Affairs without unprecedented technology advances. Also clearly, more and more 
computers are becoming safety critical, or relevant to national security, or whatever. 
[Schwartau] Of course it is. That's what makes it possible. For information in war, 
technology is the enabler, and for Pure IW, technology is the weapon and the target. See 
above. 
[Steele] In the ideal, information war and peace is technology independent, that is to say, a 
very fine information strategy and information policy, as well as very fine information 
operations, can be developed and pursued without any enabling technoiogy at all. Right 
now the offense (the mutts) have the advantage against the defense (the status quo Western 
powers) because the leverage they can derive from attacking complex technical 
infrastructures with physical tools (or electrical tools) is enormous. Right now offensive 
war by anonymous individuals is enabled. Defense is hampered by the complexity of the 
systems, and the lack of equivalent political and doctrinal arrangements. 
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2. Commonalities and Differences 
Many participants thought that information warfare is both enabled or enhanced by 
technology and dependent on technology. There are obvious forms of information warfare 
(such as psychological operations through leaflet drops) that exist outside of modem 
information technology, although such methods may be enhanced by information 
technology. Just as clearly, as Mr. Peter Cochrane writes, "technology simply enables new 
forms of Information Warfare." These new forms of modem infonilation warfare would 
not exist without technology and are thus dependent on information technology. 
Again, there are clear parallels to the development of airpower. Limited early forms 
of air warfare (e.g., the use of observation balloons in the Civil War) were not dependent 
on the modem aerospace technologies now in use. But modem forms of air warfare are 
definitely dependent on such technology. 
B. KEY TECHNOLOGIES 
Given that technology plays such a key role in information warfare, this question 
asks about the specific technologies that are currently vital in information warfare. The 
purpose is to identify and understand current technology as a precursor to discussing future 
technologies of information warfare. 
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1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] What are the current key or enabling technologies of 
information warfare? 
[Campen] 
1. High bandwidth transmission. 
2. Mass storage. 
3. Data search technologies. 
4. Simulations. 
[Cochrane] Computers and telecommunications technology in all forms seen by "users" 
(TV; radio, fax, Internet), plus all of the infrastructures that go with them (fixed, mobile, 
satellite). Mobile computing and communications, including mobile and satellite 
systems, computing systems of all kinds, well known operating systems and glass, wire 
and radio networks. (Don't forget the soldier on a motorbike, he is still very useful). 
[Cohen] Information technology-as a whole. 
[Dunnigan] Hype. 
[Giessler] All the wares. Within hardware we can't keep up with COTS [Commercial Off-
The-Shelf]-but the chip and the satellite and the EMS [Electro-Mechanical Systems] and 
the fiberoptics are all intertwined-and we couldn't do anything without mundane things 
like electricity. · 
[Gust] Clearly, digital signal processors are the key enabling technologies in our info and 
info warfare business area. Their increasing capacity and reducing size makes them the 
choice for the brains in almost any system design. 
[Hazlett] Offensive: jamming, global positioning systems, satellites, computers. 
Defensive: crypto, stealth, computers. 
[King] Systems with very large computational and storage ·capabilities, worldwide high-
speed networks, growth in mobile technologies. 
[Levien] There is no doubt that the technological base of the Information Warfare 
revolution is the "Tyranny of the Chip!!" The fact that there has been an exponential 
growth in the speed and capacity of the semiconductor chip, along with a reciprocal 
exponential drop in the cost and the size of this same chip, has indeed opened the door to 
EVERYTHING else that drives information warfare. This is not to detract from the 
growth in the field of computer design and software skills, but these evaluations were 
only possible once the semiconductor nerds did their thing. All else derived from the 
seminal work of Shockley, Bretain and Bardeen at the Bell Telephone Laboratories back in 
the 50's with the discovery of the transistor. 
[Libicki] Other than information systems in general? 




[Probst] A partial list includes: 
- high-performance computing and communications 
- high-performance data assimilation and analysis for centralized intelligence fusion and 
correlation, and battlespace understanding 
- control-theory technologies for automated strategic decision making at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of war 
- major advances in modelling and simulation 
- bandwidth negotiation in virtual networks 
- information-survivability technologies 
[Schwartau] We can go on and on about bandwidth and MIPS [Million Instructions Per 
Second] and the evolving power of the networks and computers. But I am looking for 
more than standard old think for IW. I expect to see in the next 10 years: 
- Greater mind-man interface 
- True VR [Virtual Reality] 
-nano-technology weapons (those are fun!) 
-Breakthrough cryptanalysis: "There are no more secrets" 
- Targetable remote bio weapons (in distinction to mass destruction bio weapons) 
- Psychic warfare capabilities should reach the battlefield. 
[Steele] Technical access plus hacker-like understanding. 
[Todd] The microprocessor and the connectivity between those emerging technologies has 
defined the information age. The ability to process and distribute information results in 
great opportunities and challenges for warfare in the information age.[Loescher] The 
powerful ones haven't been invented yet-but Java is a start at a world of software robots. 
[Probst] A partial list includes: 
- high-performance computing and communications 
- high-performance data assimilation and analysis for centralized intelligence fusion and 
correlation, and battlespace understanding 
- control-theory technologies for automated strategic decision making at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of war 
- major advances in modelling and simulation 
- bandwidth negotiation in virtual networks 
- information-survivability technologies 
[Schwartau] We can go on and on about bandwidth and MIPS and the evolving power of 
the networks and computers. But I am looking for more than standard old think for IW. I 
expect to see in the next 10 years: 
- Greater mind-man interface 
- True VR [Virtual Reality] 
- nano-technology weapons (those are fun!) 
-Breakthrough cryptanalysis: "There are no more secrets" 
- Targetable remote bio weapons (in distinction to mass destruction bio weapons) 
- Psychic warfare capabilities should reach the battlefield. 
[Steele] Technical access plus hacker-like understanding. 
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[Todd] The micro processor and the connectivity between those emerging technologies has 
defined the information age. The ability to process and distribute information results in 
great opportunities and challenges for warfare in the information age. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
Broadly construed, the answer as to what are key information warfare technologies 
is "all information technologies." More specifically, the important technologies identified 
could be boiled down into a few general areas: 
• Mobile and fixed high bandwidth transmission capabilities via various means 
• Modelling and simulation advances 
• Computers with massive processing capabilities 
• Increased mass storage 
• Data search, analysis and fusion tools 
• Ubiquitous and cheap CPU s and digital signal processors 
• Sophisticated cryptology 
• Standard and widely-used operating·systems (like UNIX) 
• Electricityt 
Finally, one point made by Dr. Fred Levien bears further emphasis. While all the 
various information technologies play important roles in information warfare, much of this 
progress is dependent on the continued growth in the power and speed of microprocessors 
along with the accompanying drop in cost and size. This relationship has held true 
throughout the development of the microprocessor, but will it hold true in the future? 
I As Dr. Fred Giessler points out, underlying most of these technologies is the requirement for electricity.· 
This category of technology could be labelled more generically as "power sources and batteries." 
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C. THE BEST OFFENSE IS A GOOD DEFENSE? 
Information warfare is generally thought to have both offensive and defensive 
components (Defense Science Board, 1994). Obviously the strategies and techniques for 
these components are different. But is the same true of the technologies to support 
offensive and defensive information warfare? This question examines whether there are 
distinctions between the two technology sets. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Are there differences between "offensive" and "defensive" 
information warfare technologies? 
[Campen] Depends. An offensive technology is constructed to exploit a known 
vulnerability in a defensive technology. Example: A virus and a firewall both use 
software technology. A defense against an electromagnetic attack might be a fuse, a shield 
or physical separation. 
[Cebrowski] Information itself is the basis. Information technology is the broker, tool and 
application, in different ways. As such, technology serves to shape and present 
information. The control over how, how fast and how accurately information technology 
works on and with information is the essence of both offensive and defensive information 
warfare. 
[Cochrane] The underlying technologies will be the same in both situations-it is just a 
matter of how they are used and where you sit as to whether they are offensive or 
defensive. E.g., if you write a software agent that goes around all the systems it can and 
gathers information then from your point of view it is a defence agent that spots enemies. 
To the person owning the system it is an offensive piece of technology. Offensive 
strategies are likely to require highly trained teams with specialised knowledge. Defensive 
technologies will include information monitoring and filtering together with computer 
and network resilience and healing techniques. Some have said offence is easier than 
defence but that may not be the case. A direct attack might be easy to mount but could be 
easier to trace back to the originator. 
[Cohen] Yes. To be a good defender, you have to understand all about offense and find cost 
effective ways to provide adequate protection against the wide range of offensive 
potentials. To be a good offender, you have to find a hole and exploit it to your ends. The 
technologies for doing this are quite different. 
[Dunnigan] Not really. 
40 
[Giessler] Many if not most overlap. Generally they are two sides of the 'info technologies 
coin. And you must consider both sides as you contemplate the coin. And you must 
consider the coin with two sides and a center as a system-that is fully connected. 
[Gust] The Army labs here at Monmouth always give a sample of new info technology, 
i.e., a new radio, to the lEW [Intelligence and Electronic Warfare] Directorate to see if it 
has certain vulnerabilities or can be defeated easily. 
[Hazlett] Yes, some systems, such as crypto are inherently better suited for defense; while 
others such as active electronic or acoustic jamming are offensive. 
[King] Yes. Internet security gateways are defensive weapons. There are some systems 
that attempt to detect threats and then try to go on the offensive and track them down. 
Defense is harder as it has to cope with a great variety of different offensive systems. 
[Levien] The difference between "offensive" and "defensive" IW technologies are to my 
mind almost all legal ones. There is of course the differences in perception that has been 
recently highlighted between the Army and the Air Force as how to wage the new IW 
warfare. The really tough question is how to ask a military officer to "defend his country 
against all its' enemies whomsoever ... foreign or domestic;' when you cannot clearly tell 
him who his enemy really is, and then threaten him with courts martial if he makes the 
wrong choice in the small instant of time he has available before he must act given the 
great body of legal garbage that awaits (much of it contradictory) for the Monday morning 
quarterbacks to quote from after the fact. 
[Libiclci] What dllferences exist are relatively minor (techniques of infoint collection are 
probably offensive in nature while CCD [Charge Coupled Devices] technologies tend to 
be defensive), and hard to distinguish. 
[Loescher] Yes, technologically. However, operationally, the dual necessity of offensive 
and defensive actions is vital. In Navy, C4I is becoming more and more splintered, 
lacking advocacy, while IW, which in Navy is cryptology reinventing itself, is 
prevailing. That's a mistake. For the U.S., information is primarily a force subtract or at 
this stage because our dependency on it holds us tactically, if not strategically, banking 
on it. If you ask yourself what a small country can do to defend against an overwhelming 
military force, the options are clear. We need C4I more than we need offensive 
IW-though both are important. Unfortunately, in Navy, they are dividing. I see my job 
as helping to restore that balance. However, the technology of IW is tangible, while the 
promise of C4I is still in view graphs. That's a hard-but vital-sell. 
[Merritt] You bet. Defensive will be a lot harder, on all fronts. A lot of work remaining 
to be done. How do you do reconnaissance? What sensors do you need? How do you do 
IW Indications and Warning? How do you build countermeasures that don't become 
obsolete immediately? 
[Probst] If we use these words they way I have defined them, then they are quite hard to 
separate. I would imagine that anyone skilled in one would be reasonably skilled in the 
other. 
Sometimes it helps to solve a simpler problem first. 
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Computer-aided Postal Chess 
White and Black both have chess computers that function as "brain multipliers". The 
chess computers have a chess rating, and can be set for different levels of play. 
The leaders of the Revolution in Computer-Aided Postal Chess have ordered you to trade 
in your expert computer for a grandmaster computer. 
Offense and defense change in subtle fashions: 
- if I upgrade my chess computer, that does not ipso facto downgrade your computer, but 
it does give me an advantage 
- if I break into your house and monkey with your chess computer so that it 
surreptitiously plays at less than full strength, that's a "Level-3 IW attack":-) 
- if I change the locks at my house, so that you won't be able to reply in kind, that's 
"defensive information warfare" 
- if you cut off the supply of electricity to my house, you have attacked my infrastructure 
-and so on 
[Schwartau] In order to defend, you have to know the offensive capabilities, so there is a 
great deal of similarity, although the techniques are different. I would have to write out a 
chart, but it would include thoughts like: 
Sniffing Crypto 
Sniffmg Authentication 
Viruses Smart 0/S 
Laser Interception Masking 
PsyOps Truth Police 
and so on. Good question with an infinity of possible answers. 
[Steele] Offense is much much easier and can be physical as well as electronic. Defense is 
an order of magnitude more complex and expensive. 
[Todd] Based on the comments to this question, there appeared to be a predominant notion 
that offensive and defensive technologies referred to hardware aspect only. While 
technologies are themselves "hardware," I think a point might have been lost. During the 
Korean War, the MIG-17 was superior in hardware (performance) to that of the earlier 
model F-86s. However, the American's retained a superior combat record of 10:1 over the 
adversaries. In this case, your superiority in training and combat tactics mitigated a 
technological inferiority. So it is in IW. Our risk analysis indicates that the better 
training and education of the user and systems administrators results in a far superior 
investment vs. results scenario that merely "engineering in" defensive solutions. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
To a large extent, the group felt that the underlying technologies for performing 
offensive and defensive information warfare are the same. While there may be technologies 
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that are more suited to one or the other, in general the difference is more in how the 
technologies are used (the application or technique2) than in any underlying difference in 
the basic technologies. Several group members also thought that information warfare 
defense is much harder than offense because the defender must understand the techniques 
and technologies of all possible offensive attacks, while the attacker need find only a single 
vulnerability in the target information function. 
D. INFORMATION WARFARE SYSTEMS 
Much of the acquisition process is built around the development and fielding of 
systems. As a lead-in to future discussions about information warfare acquisition, this 
issue asks about what might be regarded as an "information warfare system." 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] What can be considered an "information warfare system?" 
[Campen] The assemblage of people, processes, equipment and software needed to wage 
conflict in the electromagnetic spectrum and protect itself against attack. 
[Cebrowski] There is no "pure" information warfare system from a technical or weapons 
system standpoint. Weapons systems can perform information warfare functions, but as a 
byproduct of technical design. However, an information warfare system can be defined in 
terms of a series of interrelated processes that include technology. For example, an 
information warfare process may consist of established standards and scope for 
information protection, coupled with adequate attack detection and restoral tools and 
techniques. 
[Cochrane] An information warfare system is any collection of resotirces that can be 
utilised in order to further your aims in a conflict by disseminating or disrupting 
information. E.g., lorry packed with a fertiliser bomb can be a useful information warfare 
2Col. David Todd makes the point that throughout the history of war, good techniques and proper training 
have often compensated for inferior technology. 
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system when driven into the country's central bank. The most critical element of ALL 
information warfare systems is the human brain. It will always find a new way of 
adapting an innocent system into something that can be used for a more devious purpose. 
[Cohen] All systems are IW systems in some sense. It's their USE and not their 
CONTENT that dictates their involvement in IW. 
[Dunnigan] General U. S. Grant standing next to a telegraph operator ... 
[Garigue] A group of knowledgeable individuals and a truly modem on line library. 
[Giessler] Any set of elements related to one another with a goal of survival in the 
information age. Such a system has input, process, output and feedback. It is a complex-
adaptive system that is teleological-goal oriented. So-a commander and his trusted 
agents (sometimes known as staff) who is trying to defeat, deter, influence the competitor 
is a I.W.S. So is a HARM [High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile] launched from any kind 
of vehicle. So is a kid with a virus attacking your info system with the objective of 
killing it. I.W. Systems are everywhere. 
[Gust] An info warfare system is probably best defined by the financial programmatic 
weapons platform it rides on-JSTARS, Rivet Joint, Guardrail, etc. That would include 
comm links, ground stations and control nodes. 
[Hazlett] Example of an information warfare system: an "active computer 
firewall/gateway" that detects attempted intrusions and attacks (and conducts 
counterattacks), yet still permits access by appropriately recognized systems. Example of 
an information warfare "system of systems:" An active ISR-RSTA [Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Reconnaissance-Reconnaissance Strike Targeting Architecture] combination 
that detects attacks on component systems and directs defenses and count~rattacks. 
[King] A collection of people and systems used to perform an offensive or defensive 
operation in an information war. 
[Levien] Other than a speeding 30-06 bullet, or a hand grenade ... about all remaining 
military systems fall into the IW system category. 
[Libicki] An A-10 with a GAU-30 [Note: this is a 30 mm cannon] will work just fine if 
there is a command center or puter system underneath. 
[Loescher] Let me answer it this way-the best system for IW is the operator's mind. The 
rest is trapping. 
[Merritt] I addressed some of this earlier. A lot of possibilities. Many of which already 
exisi, but haven't been deployed in a coordinated manner that would have impact on 
perception management on the battlefield. It is much more than a network issue. 
[Probst] Above all things, an integrated battlespace management system that uses data-
intensive predictive modelling and simulation. 
[Schwartau] Me. You. A hacker. The bad guys. The system comprises the technology+ 
motivation. Technology by itself is neutral; not bad or good. Remember, for example, 
44 
that the only difference between a programming error and malicious software is intent. Or, 
that at a microwave repeater if properly tuned and aimed creates a fine DOS [Denial of 
Service 1 device. 
[Steele] Any form of strategic thought, policy, or organization, which may or may not 
include technology, that seeks to achieve a specific information objective. 
[Todd 1 An information system consists of a system of sensors (either organic or electro-
mechanical/electromagnetic), the linkage to human decisionmaker or assessment center, 
the linkage between that decisionmaker (electromagnetic, mechanical, etc.) to a combat 
system, and the sensory feedback. I very much agree along the lines of links, nodes and 
human elements comprise a IW system. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
Several thoughts emerge from the above comments. The first is that an information 
warfare system is more a combination of elements working together to perform information 
warfare functions than a single identifiable end-item. These elements could include 
hardware, software, policies, procedures, and perhaps most importantly, human brains. 
Thus Admiral Cebrowski's remark that there are no "pure" information warfare systems in 
the sense of the traditional weapons systems or platforms. 
The other common thread once again deals with the issue of means versus ends. 
From this standpoint, any system can be an information warfare system depending on how 
they are used. Employing a hard kill or a "kinetic solution" to take out a target qualifies the 
particular attacking system as an information warfare system when used against an 
information function such as a computer system. 
E. SYNTHESIS 
The relationship between information warfare and information technology is deep 
and fundamental. While many methods of information warfare can exist independent of 
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technology, their effectiveness and military usefulness can be greatly enhanced by 
information technologies. There are also a number of modem methods that are completely 
dependent on information technologies. In general, these technologies are the same for both 
waging offensive information war and for protecting against information attacks-only the 
techniques and applications are different. This implies a need for close ties between those 
developing and using technologies for offensive purposes and those developing and using 
technologies for defensive purposes. 
In terms of specific technologies, the participants identified a number of presently 
important information technology areas. There were also technologies not mentioned, but 
which seem key for information warfare. These include the development of tools and 
methodologies to support the design of very complex industrial-strength software and the 
advances in miniaturization which allow the incorporation of generic information 
technologies into smaller and smaller end-items. And while not necessarily a "technology," 
the establishment of common standards fo! interoperability and data exchange are a 
prerequisite for the enhanced connectivity so important in the information age. Including 
these yields the following categories of vital technologies: 
• Technologies that allow connectivity 
• Data storage, fusing, and extraction tools and technologies 
• Modelling and simulation techniques 
• Technologies that allow for security through encryption 
• Tools and methodologies for development of complex software 
• Miniaturization techniques 
• Power and battery technologies 
• Common standards for interoperability and data exchange 
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Finally, with a few exceptions such as electronic warlare platforms, there do not 
seem to be cleanly segregable information warlare systems in the traditional sense. Dr. 
Andrew Marshall, the DoD Director of Net Assessment, recognizes this when he states, 
"these technologies do not seem to promise some distinctive new platform around which a 
revised doctrine and force structure can be built" (Marshall, 1994). Much as C4I systems, 
information warlare systems are more collections of hardware, software, procedures and 
people. This has development and acquisition implications that will be explored shortly. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF COMMERCIAL DEPENDENCE 
Information system superiority is dependent on an ability to incorporate the latest in 
commercial technologies. 
-Defense Science Board Summer Study, 1994 
Driven by tight budgets and a need for cost savings, dependence on all manner of 
"off the shelf' commercial technology, products, and standards is fast becoming a way of 
life for the military. Use of commercial technology is promoted at the highest levels and 
this is especially true for information technology. This topic is concerned about some of the 
broader information warfare implications of such increased dependence on the commercial 
sector. 
A. THE INFORMATION WARFARE EDGE 
One hallmark of commercial technology-with some few exceptions-is that many 
commercial items are available for purchase to anyone who has the money to buy them. 
This is especially true in the case of commercial information technology, where some items 
are produced by potential enemies and most items are procurable by potential enemies 
(Christian, et al, 1995). Thus possible foes will be able to obtain the same basic 
information warfare technologies in use by the United States or its allies. If the above is 
true, then sole access to the latest technologies will not be guaranteed. In this 
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technologically-levelled playing field, what will give one side or the other an advantage in 
waging information warfare? 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] If everyone (including potential adversaries) has access to 
commercial information technologies useful in information warfare, 
then what will give the U.S. and allies an edge? 
[Campen] It is not a question of access, it is a question of the timely and innovative 
exploitation of that technology. 
[Cebrowski] The edge comes in the synergistic application of technology. For DoD, it's 
organizing all the IW elements as a system, then integrating it into the larger system of 
warfighting ... in a way that enhances ops tempo. Technology is only an enabler. The real 
power comes from organization and employment concepts. If we don't tackle this area 
soon, we will lose the lead! 
[Cochrane] Access to commercial Information Technology does not of itself define an edge 
in Information Warfare. Advantage in warfare is not just the possession of weaponry, it is 
its effective use and the knowledge of how to survive in order to use it again in a combat 
situation. This edge can be gained during the development, trailing and training in 
Information Warfare techniques. The scale of investment and technological inertia in the 
commercial sector will only slightly reduce the scale of the advan~ge that military 
strategists would like to attain. 
[Cohen] The non-COTS [Commercial Off-The-Shelf] part-the way we connect things 
together-the way we use things-the skill and training and education of the people using 
~~~~~~~~~ . 
[Dunnigan] Yes. We have more experience and resources in NetLand and, all things being 
equal, should prevail (Napoleon: "Victory goes to the bigger battalions." Unless they're 
Austrian, of course ... ) 
[Garigue] The differential comes from the software. Let's not forget that it is the software 
that make the machine. There can be some substantial capability gains that come from 
the usage of COTS in Life Cycle Management areas such as costs, availability, 
acquisition, disposal etc .. but the real warfighting advantage will come from the 
"configuration" of these software machines and the resulting networks that are developed 
to support enlightened decision making. Multiplied by the net, one software program can 
be replicated in each machine and because of this flexibility thousands of more 
knowledgeable decisions can be made. The network can now distribute knowledge very 
rapidly. So it is the software (and the wetware) that confers new information warfare 
capabilities to the organization, COTS is simply the delivery method. 
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[Gust] Not everyone has access to all commercial info technologies. In addition, my PEO 
[Program Executive Officer] has recently had a requested FMS [Foreign Military Sales] 
sale of Night Vision goggles to an ally be disapproved by HQ, DA [Headquarters, 
Department of the Army]. There still has to be some area of exclusiveness for the U.S. 
forces to retain a technological edge. 
· 
[Hazlett] Inrwvative organizational concepts, accelerated and automated decisionmaking, 
and more flexible and automated communications routing. 
[King] The edge will belong to those who develop a strategic plan and are willing to make 
the investments necessary to always be ahead of the wave and not merely on it. The U.S. 
currently has an advantage in its knowledge and deployment of high-speed nets. 
[Probst] Two slwrt answers: 
- articulate the new operational concepts so that we can have a Revolution in Military 
Affairs 
- exploit the U.S. edge in superior doctrine, superior machines, superior algorithms, and 
deployed effective Defensive Warfare 
[Schwartau] We have to do a couple of things: 
1. Make sure that the military still has an edge up on technology that does not reach the 
commercial sector. This is true with the nature of the DEW [Directed Energy Weapons] 
(HERF [High Energy Radio Frequency] style weapons) that the military develops. They 
are vastly more powerful and useful than the homebrew commercial versions. We must 
take similar approaches with related "weapons." 
2. We have to build an organization that is capable of C41 style deployment and 
engagement to either avoid conventional conflict, or replace conventional conflict. 
[Steele] The U.S. and allies can only have an "edge" if they stop lying to themselves and 
admit that the existing communications and computing industries are "out of control" and 
ignorant if not criminally negligent with respect to C41 security. The "missing link" in 
IW is a secure home front, and this requires a national program-understood by and 
supported by the people-to embed decent security in all U.S.A. produced cyber-products. 
This will, incidentally, give a boost, to U.S.A.-based producers, whose security "quality" 
will serve as a major market differentiator. Included in this new commitment to security 
(and all it implies in terms of data integrity, etc.) will be the ability to detect and eradicate foreign-produced viruses and backdoors-for instance, the industry today is compounding 
its traditional failure .to document software code with the outsourcing of much major code 
production to Calcutta and Moscow. We have no idea what these people are putting 
"between the lines" and we should be very concerned. 
[Todd] Do not necessarily agree that all potential adversaries will have access to 
commercial information technology ... certainly the possibility is there, but to what 
degree. Likewise, while other countries may "leap frog" us in more state of the art 
technologies (go from no telephone service to cellular phone servic.e and bypassing 
telephone wires), the market place may dictate how and what is available. This disconnect 
between 2nd, 3rd, 4th generation telecommunication systems, networks, and processing 
capabilities will enable us to analyze the "seam" in their architecture and exploit them. 
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2. Commonalities and Differences 
The first reaction to this question, as pointed out by several participants, is that 
there will always be some advanced and unique technology only avirilable to the military. 
Thus these unique technologies will be one part of any information warfare edge. Another 
possible area for gaining an advantage is how well a country or organization is able to 
develop and implement the doctrinal and operational concepts required to take advantage of 
information warfare. Related to this area is how well an organization adapts its structure to 
develop information warfare capabilities, especially in terms of developing people with the 
right skills, training and education to effectively conduct information warfare activities. 
Finally, there were two more technologically oriented answers. The first is that 
simply having the technology is not enough. How effectively and how fast such 
technology is integrated and exploited is the real key to any information warfare edge. The 
best technology improperly integrated and/or exploited in a tardy manner will be of little use 
when faced with slightly less advanced technology correctly integrated and available now. 
Lastly, LCDR Robert Garigue argues that software is the key "differential." Hardware 
items are typically general-purpose tools and it is the software that embodies the "brains" of 
most information systems. How effectively one is able to configure and lash together 
systems via the development of good software could provide the crucial information 
warfare advantage. 
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INTEGRITY 
Within the government and military, there is an ever-i~creasing reliance on 
hardware and software developed completely outside of government or military channels. 
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With this reliance comes a concern for the integrity and general security of products 
obtained on both the domestic and global commercial markets. In additional to domestic 
software and information technology development, software coding is being outsourced to 
places such as Russia and India and integrated circuits are being developed in countries all 
around the world. During such development, there are opportunities for the insertion of 
malicious software code or circuit paths into normal commercial products that may 
eventually be used in government or military information systems. How these possibilities 
might be addressed is the next topic for the group participants. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Given the possibilities for "chipping" and software· 
"backdoors," how do we ensure the integrity of domestic commercial 
manufacturing and software processes? How do we ensure the integrity 
of foreign commercial components and systems which we might use? 
[Campen] You don't even try. We must presume this threat and concentrate on the means 
of extremely rapid detection, fault isolation, and corrective actions. · 
[Cebrowski] Demonstrate to naysayers that the issues can be managed within reasonable 
cost. The key is to establish a systemic, national-level process that includes: scope and 
standards for what should be protected and to what extent (a risk management process); 
responsive indications and warning/attack analysis; and a broad range of flexible response 
options. This process will not demonstrate a nation that is invulnerable, but rather one 
which is constantly vigilant, decisive and prepared to respond to any threat, foreign or 
domestic, with a full range of national security tools. 
[Cochrane] Chipping and "backdoors" are as much a problem to commercial entities as 
they are to the military. An attack on a large banking institution may cause as much 
damage to a nation as an attack on a military installation. Existing examination of 
systems based on guides such as the Orange Book are of limited use. Experience has 
shown that these processes are difficult to "sell" to software developers. To complement 
this we need to develop penetrative testing in ways that simulate real attacks and study 
how systems will react. 
[Cohen] With rare exceptions, we don't, and that's an important issue today. 
[Dunnigan] You can never let up your guard on such things. Put it out of sight and you 
can expect the bad guys to come in through your back door. 
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[Garigue] There will never be any guarantee that software will be proven correct and have 
no "defects" because of the enormous difficulty of checking large complex programs. 
Networks are even more problematic. The analysis can only be limited to small portions 
of programs or objects. And even when programs can be proven correct; there still would 
exist the possibility for perfectly correct code becoming malicious (Jekyll and Hyde 
programs). Partitioning mission critical processes from other processes, and ensuring that 
some functions be performed via an agency of differently coded processes does enables a 
certain measure of redundancy, cross checking of results, and graceful degradation of 
performance. 
[Gust] This is an area where integrity of use requires adherence to patent and license 
concerns. We should pay for software intellectual rights if we use it in our systems. 
[Hazlett] Developing and instituting a "red team" concept for testing and evaluating 
software. Developing an "overlay" for domestic and foreign software and components, that 
detects and reports intrusions and alterations. 
[King] There are processes and methods that can be put in place but there will always be 
the question of the cost of achieving a given level of assurance and the impossibility of 
that level being 100%. Thus, systems must detect and contain suspicious subsystems 
(not an easy problem). 
[Probst] 
- legal requirements for due diligence with severe financial penalties 
-never trusting software you haven't (re)written yourself 
-spreading the ''public health" approach to component integrity 
- eternal vigilance following adequate training (e.g., personal monitoring of personal audit 
trails-cf. Shimomura) 
- less practical: never trusting hardware you haven't designed yourself (testing and 
certification may be of some help here) 
[Schwartau] Someone read my book! Thanks. That's the problem. We will have to 
develop new methods of process engineering, assurance mechanisms and automated 
reliance tools. Similarly, we will have to develop additional non-destructive testing 
methods for completed products as an inspection or QA [Quality Assurance] procedure. 
[Steele] The Department of Commerce is simply not up to the challenges of the 21st 
Century (neither is much of the rest of the USG [U.S. Government], but at least DoD 
knows there is. a 21st Century). The first step must be legislation which requires "due 
diligence" on the part of all manufacturers and vendors of communications and 
computational hardware, software, and related services. They must be required to assure 
their customers that it is safe to work and play in cyberspace, and must be held 
accountable, using new and solid international standards, to the highest levels of embedded 
security. The U.S. position on key escrow is ignorant and flies in the face of both history 
and cyber-power. Until we give up the idea of legislating back doors for law enforcement, 
we will not be able to provide common security to the whole. 
The FBI should be given funding ($500 million a year) for a new Electronic Security & 
Counterintelligence Division, and the Secret Service should be relieved of its dubious 
claims to the mission of handling crimes in cyberspace. National testing & certification 
laboratories should be established using existing capabilities (for instance, one of the 
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Department of Energy laboratories), and all foreign hardware and software should be 
· subjected to both preliminary and ongoing (random) testing. All hardware and software 
being introduced to government installations should be individually tested. Corporations 
should have liability incentives for doing the same thing. Ultimately we should eliminate 
portable disks and require that all data and software be sent from one info sec gate to 
another for scanning and air gap transfer under control. 
[Todd] The ability to protect our systems needs to be the first priority in this emerging 
warfare area. Our first goal is to raise the our integrity of our systems to such a level that 
the "casual" hacker cannot get primary access to our network system. This can be done 
with an integrated approach of engineering ftxes, highly trained system administrators, 
and highly aware users. This will have to be a continuing effort. But we will still need to 
understand that the top 5 percentile of professional hackers will still be.able to penetrate 
our system. Now we need a system of both highly trained people and equipment that can 
identify such activity, bound its effect, recover systems that are damaged or corrupted, and 
work back to the origin of the attack for either criminal prosecution or counterintelligence 
activities. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
The group took two basic approaches 1 to this question. The first approach lies with 
what the manufacturers and commercial firms must do themselves in order to assure 
product integrity. It is suggested that firms construct much better ways to check and ensure 
product integrity through new methods of engineering, assurance checking and 
developmental testing. Then once a vendor has sold a product, it is certifying both a given 
level of security assurance to the customer and that it has exercised "due diligence" in the 
development of its product. The term "due diligence" implies a legal duty to a customer, a 
breach of which is punishable under law. This provides a financial 'incentive for firms to 
seek product integrity. 
1 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has taken a strong interest in both of these 
areas. It is currently funding dozens of efforts in the fields of high confidence networking, high confidence 
computing systems, development and integration assurance, and survivability/vulnerability techniques and tools (DARPA, 1996). 
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The other approach to this problem deals with what the customer should do to 
protect themselves from products of unknown integrity. Under this view, it is not possible 
or wise to assume the integrity of any product and a certain amount of vulnerability is 
presumed. Then activities are taken to mitigate any hazards. Such activities include risk 
assessments, development of means for threat detection, and implementation of a scalable 
range of comprehensive assurance testing for commercial hardware and software. In 
addition, larger systems can be designed to combat malicious code or chips through 
architectures that support redundancy and partitioning of critical elements. 
C. INFLUENCING COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
. . 
The previous question highlighted the fact that commercial firms may be able to 
address many of the military's information protection concerns during the product 
development cycle. But with a declining overall DoD budget and a rapidly growing 
commercial sector, DoD's share of the commercial information technology market is 
growing smaller and the military has less market influence than it once had (Berkowitz, 
1995). With such declining influence, how should the military incentivize vendors to take 
(perhaps) unique security requirements into account in the building of commercial products 
later purchased off-the-shelf by the military. 
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1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Given the decreasing financial leverage of the military in 
the commercial marketplace, how should the military positively engage 
firms to take military needs into account during the commercial product 
development process? 
[Campen] First you take into account the remarkable similarities in "needs" between the 
private and military sector and identify short falls. The military then applies its talents 
and funds on those relatively few shortfalls. 
[Cebrowski] This is achieved by answering and addressing two questions: What must be 
protected? Certainly not "everything." This is the policy issue on the scope of protection. 
What type and level of protection is appropriate, under a managed risk approach? This is 
the technical question of "standards." Those commercial organizations wishing to "do 
business" with the protected enclave must interoperate on its terms. Over time, the 
standards become universal-not by mandate, but by market forces. 
[Cochrane] By locking companies into the development cycle as the military outsources 
everything. The military is still doing studies, still funding universities, still doing 
original stuff. Forming a partnership with companies on joint programmes where there is 
a synergy between the applications. What is the difference between secure banking, secure 
networking for industry, and the military-only degree! 
[Cohen] Money. 
[Dunnigan] Pay them money. That always works. Beyond that, the troops have little 
influence. 
[Garigue] I believe that that is not required. The present capability of components and 
systems by far exceeds the present majority of our needs. The notions that competitive 
advantages will come from faster, smaller, more secure, robust,· and functional 
information systems are already accepted goals and are driving every commercial 
innovation process. We need not emphasize these expectancies. However, we do need a 
more focused effort on the problem of how to use these capabilities to impose order or 
defuse conflict. 
[Gust] We use a dialog process in the Army which includes Advance Planning Briefings 
to industry and discussions via an electronic bulletin board for draft RFPs [Request for 
Proposals]. We also speak to symposiums and industry forums. Finally, pre-solicitation 
conferences advertise the near-term release of the RFP to the interested bidders who 
responded to our CBD [Commerce Business Daily] announcement. 
[Hazlett] Revise acquisition procedures so that government specs do not needlessly burden 
process. Revise "lowest bidder" rules so that government can purchase "best value." 
[King] The military needs to be very clear and realistic about how its needs differ from 
commercial needs. There will continue to be companies that make mil spec versions of 
commercial products for those few cases where they are really needed. 
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[Probst] Build military applications on top of COTS hardware and software. If you really 
need something different, talk to them. 
[Schwartau] Declassify the threat to the commercial sector. Put us all on the same team. 
[Steele] Declassify the threat. Not only will the private sector not heal itself until it fully 
appreciates the problem (and stockholders know enough to hold management liable for 
being stupid about electronic security), but the military will never heal itself as long as 
C41 "deficiencies" are classified-the latter guarantees that only the people that created the 
problems in the first place will have the clearances to jerk around with possible solutions, 
oblivious as they are to the explosion of innovation in the private sector, far from all 
SCIFs [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities]. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
One of the commonly voiced thoughts on this question is that there is a remarkable 
correlation between the information protection needs of the military and the needs of those 
in the commercial world who seek secure banking, purchasing, networking and databases. 
The overlap is great and there are few unique military requirements. For those singular 
areas, the military should clearly identify its needs and "pay money" for the commercial 
vendors to include the features directly or add the hooks necessary for the military to add 
hardware or software on top of the commercial item. 
Finally, the point was made by several participants that the best way to ensure that 
commercial items include some measure of information protection is to "declassify the 
threat." Sharing (in some manner) the information warfare threats and vulnerabilities 
already identified by the government would allow commercial establ~shments to apply their 
own resources against these vulnerabilities. Fixes made and included in their products 
going to market will then benefit the military when it buys such products. 
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D. LEARNING FROM COMMERCIAL FIRMS 
On one hand, the military might have useful information protection data it could 
share with commercial firms. Likewise, non-military enterprises that use commercial 
information technology also may have something to teach the military in this area. This 
question addresses what and how military and commercial activities can learn from each 
other. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Many commercial firms (for example, banking firms) share 
the same "information protection" concerns as the government. What 
can the military learn from bow these companies conduct information 
warfare functions? How should we share this information? 
[Cebrowski] This first step is to raise awareness of senior level management and 
encourage dialog in interagency fora. An understanding of the inherent :vulnerabilities of 
information-based technologies will spawn focused efforts on security processes, 
procedures, and policy. If we can learn anything from the commercial sector, it's the 
extremely low tolerance for ignoring security policy. Before this can be done at the scale 
and levels required, government must put in place the policies and legal protections 
necessary to secure interests and equities. 
[Cochrane] Such commercial enterprises have communications and systems that are often 
held by, or accessible by, "the enemy" and are open to attack on more than one front. 
Commerce probably has simulated and experienced a greater number of attack scenarios 
and now can respond to an attack faster than the military. Information technology is the 
life blood of a modem nation, if it is cut off then society crashes and stops. Sharing is 
only a problem for the military; they will just have to get used to the idea! 
[Cohen] These firms do a poor job of it in military terms, but the military could, at a 
minimum, adopt the same minimum standards these frrms use in addition to current DoD 
standards. 
[Dunnigan] You mean, "how do you get them to share information with you." The banks 
are in real info-war mode at all times. These are the folks with the "combat experience" 
regarding what works and what does not. In the peace time, the military is playing games 
while the banks are battling the hordes of cybernasties. 
[Garigue] Open societies as well as open systems are more robust because the spread of 
critical information and knowledge on security helps everyone. Continuing an open 
dialogue at all levels between the concerned groups such as between the banking, power, 
telecom, and military communities as well as with the security advocate groups within 
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Internet will ensure that the weakest network functions will be identified and brought into 
line with acceptable security procedures. What benefits one community, benefits the net 
and benefits all communities. 
[Gust] There is a formed chartered organization in the Army, supervised by the HQ, DA 
DISC4 [Director of Information Systems and C4] office responsible for the "C2 Protect" 
mission. I am not totally current on the details of their involvement with commercial 
businesses, but know that a process is in place. 
[Hazlett] Government should fund a portion of the research so that it can benefit from the 
discoveries and be part owner in the product. Share in licensing the procedures and 
products. 
[King] There is a lot to be learned but it will be a difficult process. There are signs such 
as the "Invitational Workshop on Computer Vulnerability Data Sharing" scheduled for 
June in Gaithersburg that this is recognized as a common problem that must be solved. 
[Probst] 
-Banks worry about information security and banking-systems security. Certainly one 
should talk to their security officers. I really doubt that banks crack other banks, so you 
won't find much help here. 
-The ISAT [Information Science and Technology] Summer Study on Defensive Warfare 
and Information Survivability had a balanced mix of academic, commercial, and 
government representation. 
- As the market develops, people will buy the security products they need (the 
government's role is primarily to watch over the infrastructure). 
[Schwartau] The key lesson is that much of the commercial sector can move on a dime; 
unlike slowing down a carrier in 20 miles. 
- Rapid Decision making 
-Iterative process changes 
- Adaption to market conditions 
-Policy must change as rapidly as do one's adversaries 
[Steele] Most commercial flfiils do not understand electronic vulnerabilities, in part 
because most of their security and "infosec" officers don't really understand the insides of 
their systems, and in part because corporate management will continue to shoot the 
messenger until such time as they cross a major pain threshold, i.e., are held accountable 
or "see" the losses they are incurring. The real hard problem with electronic theft, as 
Toffler and others have noted, is that electronic property can be in two places at 
once--when proprietary information is stolen, the files are still "there," they have simply 
been duplicated. 
Banking has nothing to teach us, despite the inflated claims of some self-serving 
commentators. The real experts (e.g., Eric Hughes of Cypherpunks) know how easy it is 
to penetrate both banks and trading houses, not only electronically but also through direct 
access to uncontrolled terminals on the trading floor. More simple denial of service 
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attacks, and physical interruption of services, have long been described by Winn 
Schwartau. The single greatest danger to much of the U.S.A. is the chaos and anarchy as 
well as the financial loss that will be incurred because of the lack of hard-copy backup 
documentation for electronic wealth and property ownership. It will take years to sort it 
all out, and will probably require some emergency legislation freezing all claims. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
For the most part, participants thought there was valuable information to be learned 
from business firms. While to a certain extent the operating environment and the nature of 
the threat which commercial firms face may be different from the military, many of the 
systems in use by the commercial sector are the same as ones used by the military. In 
particular, banking, utility, telecommunications, software and computer companies, along 
with various security groups, share many of the same challenges as the military. 
As to the mechanism for distributing information between these parties, some 
interaction is already occurring in an informal or ad hoc fashion through studies and 
workshops. Admiral Cebrowski sees the need for establishment of more permanent and 
formal "interagency fora" to address this issue. But as a precursor to forming of such 
groups, there must be government action to construct the policies. and legal framework 
needed to assure industry that shared information of a proprietary or sensitive nature will be 
protected. Finally, overcoming industry's fears of sharing their private data is very much 
similar to overcoming the military's fears about sharing "classified" or sensitive data with 




It is evident that military dependence on commercial information technology is 
profound and irreversible. Such technologies will also be largely available to all comers, 
reducing any purely technological edge to those few items that the military is able to 
develop itself and/or keep closely held. So to gain an overall· information warfare 
advantage, progress is required in two general areas. First, one must make the structural, 
organizational, doctrinal and educational changes2 necessary to develop and wage 
information war. Second, one must cultivate the timely and correct integration, exploitation 
and synergistic application of commercial and military-unique information technologies, 
especially through the use of adaptable and reliable software. The Defense Science Board 
nicely summed up this perspective in their 1994 Summer Study on battlefield information 
architecture when they wrote: 
It will be important to stay abreast of current and emerging technology but our real 
discriminator will be our ability to continuously infuse these technologies and to 
configure and reconfigure the ensuing products to support joint warfare. (Defense Science 
Board, 1994) 
Fortunately, America's open society gives it what Dr. Joe Nye and Admiral (Ret.) William 
Owens call an "unparalleled ability to integrate complex information systems" (Nye & 
Owens, 1996). 
In addition, it is clear that the dependence of the military on the commercial world 
and the intersection of interests between the military and commercial sectors is large enough 
to make pursuit of cooperation an important task. Issues of product integrity, upfront 
consideration of security concerns during product development and the potential benefits of 
2These changes track closely to the last two steps of a generic "revolution in military affairs" as mentioned 
in Chapter I. 
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information sharing are all ripe areas for collaboration. Despite the declining military market 
share, it is still a major player in terms of raw dollars. While the military is certainly not big 
enough to buck major market trends, it is big enough to exert some influence. This is 
especially true in areas where military concerns coincide with the concerns of the overall 
market so that teaming with industry would be beneficial to all. 
Mechanisms to promote such commercial-military teamwork already exist in other 
areas. For example, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program involves the upfront infusion of 
military dollars to make certain modifications (like adding strengthened floors and larger 
cargo doors) to commercial aircraft which make them more militarily useful. In return, 
these aircraft can then be used during times of crisis (such as Desert Shield/Desert Storm) 
in support of military needs. This approach could be adapted to support information 
warfare by engaging in a similar "modification" of commercial information technologies. 
Military funds could be used during the development of purely commercial information 
technology wares to promote the insertion of specific security features or the inclusion of 
built-in "hooks" for the addition of military unique add-on security technology. Likewise, 
the military could lend some financial support to the development and implementation of 
methodologies designed to promote product integrity of commercial items. 
Another model for commercial-government engagement is the National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Council (NSTAC). The NSTAC advises the President and 
Executive branch on telecommunications national security and emergency preparedness 
issues (NSTAC Fact Sheet, 1996). True to its name, the NSTAC is focused on 
telecommunications and its members are drawn primarily from the ranks of 
communications company chief executive officers. But the NSTAC approach could be 
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adopted by either expanding the NSTAC or by forming a similar body to consider issues 
over the broad range of information technology-to include telecommunications, software, 
computer systems, networks, etc. 
While any NSTAC-like body would be considering issues at a high policy level, 
there would also be a need for a mechanism to promote engagement at the lower levels on 
day-to-day information protection issues. One such organization already in existence is the 
government-funded Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) run out of the Software 
Engineering Institute at Carnegie-Mellon University. CERT could be expanded into a wider 
forum for cooperation on specific vulnerabilities with participation by both government and 
private organizations. 
The final area of potential engagement involves the somewhat sticky issue of 
information sharing between the government and industry over issues of information 
technology security. Stewart Baker, a former general counsel to the National Security 
Agency, highlights some of the difficulties of such sharing: 
Indeed, it's hard for government and industry to even have a dialogue on this issue. Five 
minutes into the discussion, industry says that it needs cheap unbreakable encryption to 
secure its systems, and the government asks how the FBI can catch the crooks who will 
use encryption to hide their activities. Ten minutes after that, industry is shouting "Big 
Brother" and the government is sermonizing about the World Trade Center bombing. By 
the time that fight has wound down, nobody has the energy-or the mutual trust-needed 
to discuss the gritty details of network security. 
And so we rock along, putting more and more of our infrastructure into cyberspace and 
hoping our adversaries won't notice or won't exploit those vulnerabilities. Fat chance. 
So far, the government's response has been heavily dominated by the military. But we 
won't get far without a consensus-one that includes industry-on questions like how we 
can identify organized attacks on critical civilian systems, how we can provide cost-
effective protection against the most obvious attacks, and (as a way to get industry to the 
table) how to limit the liability of companies that act responsibly in reporting and 
protecting against attacks. (Baker, 1996) 
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Companies also have legitimate concerns about the sharing of proprietary or 
sensitive data. For example, banking firms are not likely to want their information security 
problems made public because of the possible impact on public confidence in the banking 
system. Likewise companies who are trying to sell a product would rather not have any 
security vulnerabilities with that product widely known for fear of losing business. 
Industry's fears are similar to military concerns about sharing classified or sensitive data 
with others. Breaking down these barriers in a manner that protects the legitimate interests 
of all will probably require government action to construct enabling policies and a legal 
framework for information sharing. Then more useful dialogue can occur on issues of 
concern to both the government and private sector and will help ensure that the military's 
dependence on commercial information technology does not become ~ liability as well. 
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V. FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES AND RESEARCH 
The frrst essential ... necessary for our national security is preeminence in research. The 
imagination and inventive genius of our people-in industry, in the universities, in our 
armed forces, and throughout the nation-must have free play, incentive and every 
encouragement. 
- General of the Air Force "Hap" Arnold 
Advances in technology have made available better and better information warfare 
capabilities. However, these advances have resulted from the reaping of research and 
development seeds sown years ago. What should be done now to ensure continued 
technological progress and greater information w3!fare potential in the future? 
A. TECHNOLOGIES OF TOMORROW 
Just as a previous question asked about the current enabling technologies of 
information warfare, this query seeks to project that same topic into the future. Although 
predictions of the future are always a dicey proposition, Delphi participants were asked to 
give their best forecasts on upcoming key information warfare technologies. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] What are the future enabling technologies of information 
warfare? 
[Campen] Again, it's not so much technology as it is the human-machine interfaces that 
allow us to exploit technology. 
[Cochrane] Increased computer processor capability enabling rapid development of 
artificial intelligence and chameleon or polymorphic software which will hide its true 
identity and purpose. 
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[Cohen] Information technologies? This emphasis on technology is the wrong way to 
build the long-range future. The emphasis should be on understanding. De-emphasize 
systems, concentrate on concepts. 
[Dunnigan] Common sense and respect (and detailed knowledge of) for what has gone 
before. 
[Garigue] Easy high-level, end user programming capabilities will become essential as 
they permit rapid development of new information warfare and decision support programs. 
Being able to build a program will help users respond rapidly to new and emerging 
information needs. Visual programming, distributed software objects, scripting languages, 
and modular software will enable the user to rapidly enhance his information environment 
with new programs. So whatever new process is required it can be built by the end user 
himself. This will also shorten the time between requirements, specification, and 
development 
Also, as we will be faced with much more information than before, we will need to 
develop new types of knowledge management tools to monitor, collect, assess, filter, and 
aggregate data into information. Faster and more sophisticated clustering and classification 
techniques are required. Natural language interpretation and understanding based on 
cognitive modalities will help the query processes and enable a more useful dialogue 
between the human and the computer. 
As information becomes more complex, there will be a requirement for high end 
visualization. Visualization permits greater transfer bandwidth between the human and the 
computer. Simulation will be integrated and continually used in all training and planning 
processes. Virtual Reality will also permit visualization as well as enable full sensory 
interaction with all types of data and information. VR will also play a significant role in 
support of individual and group decision support environments. 
[Gust] Clearly, the expansion into frequency ranges using gigahertz as the unit of measure 
is the future. The existing and limited size of lower HF, VHF, UHF bands demands this 
extension. The technologies that will make the use of higher frequencies possible, like 
the millimeter wave solid state devices of today, need to be exploited. 
[Hazlett] Offensive: jamming, global positioning systems, satellites, computers. 
Defensive: crypto, stealth, computers. 
[King] Semiconductors (processors), optics (communications), cryptology, machine 
learning algorithms, data mining techniques, visualization, simulation of very large 
complex systems. 
[Probst] 
- programmable petaflops computers 
- high-performance virtual networks 
- high-confidence systems 
- software infrastructure for high-performance data assimilation and analysis 
- optical stores and interconnect 
- directed-energy weapons 
- ubiquitous information security including strong cryptography 
- advanced modelling and simulation technologies 
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- unconventional man-machine interfaces (e.g., personal interfaces) 
- also, the six Strategic Focus Areas of the CIC [Committee on information and 
Communication] for HPCC [High Performance Computing and Communications] 
[Schwartau] Uh uh! That comes out in IW2. I must be circumspect here. :-) [Note: IW2 
is Mr. Schwartau'sforthcoming book]. 
[Steele] Education of the individual from birth and continuing through their entire life. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
First, a number of participants made the point that technology should not be the 
focus of any future thinking in information warfare. Emphasis instead should be placed on 
understanding of information warfare concepts, education of individuals and on the 
interface between users and advanced information warfare technologies. 
Of those who took the question at face value, in general one could divide the 
answers into two types-physical advances and conceptual advances. First are the physical 
advances1, which would include progress in the generic area of "hardware" technologies: 
• Vastly increased computer processing capability 
• Technologies to support gigahertz range frequencies 
• Optical stores and interconnections 
• Directed-energy weapons 
• High-end visualization (virtual reality) and unconventional human interface tools 
• Satellites (including global positioning systems) 
I Interestingly, none of the participants mentioned microelectromechanical (MEM) systems or molecular 
nanotechnology as key future information technology areas. Mr. Larry Lynn ofDARPAreferred to :MEM as a 
"potential breakthrough technology" that promises to combine mechanical and electronic devices into single, 
very small systems (Lynn, 1995). And molecular nanotechnology, if even half of the predictions made about it 
come true, will have revolutionary impacts on information technology in general (Drexler, 1991). 
69 
Second are the conceptual advances, which would include better methodologies, 
processes and "software" technologies: 
• End-user programming capabilities 
• Cryptology 
• Machine learning algorithms 
• Advanced modelling and simulation techniques 
• Stealth (not the physical type) 
• Knowledge management tools (data assimilation, mining and analysis) 
• Polymorphic software 
Finally, Dr David Probst mentioned the six strategic focus areas for high 
performance computing and communications put forth by the Committee on Information 
and Communications of the National Science and Technology Council. As 
recommendations that went directly into the President's budget submission, these areas 
deserve separate mention. They are: 
• Global-Scale Information Infrastructure Technologies that build advanced application 
building blocks and widely-accessible information services 
• High Performance/Scalable Systems to support "high performance'.' and "low end" 
applications in a seamless fashion 
• High Confidence Systems that will provide the availability, reliability, integrity, 
confidentiality, and privacy needed by the Nation's emerging ubiquitous information 
infrastructure 
• Virtual Environments and simulations that will continue to transform scientific 
experimentation and industrial practice, and will play an increasingly important role in 
education and training 
• User-Centered Interfaces and Tools to provide easier development, navigation, "mining," 
and general use of information resources 
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• Human Resources and Education both to educate the next generation of industrial and 
academic leaders in information science and technology, and to establish a foundation for 
new learning technologies 
(National Science and Technology Council, 1995) 
B. SPENDING THE MILITARY'S R&D NICKEL 
With the large number of potentially important future technology areas mentioned 
above comes the problem of where the military should focus its own limited and dwindling 
research and development funding. This question asks which of the key information 
warfare technologies or methodologies would merit military support. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Given the military's limited research and development 
funding, what specific research should it conduct? What specific 
technologies and methodologies should it support? 
[Campen] Same as above. Study how to exploit the commercial technology to dominate 
your opponent. 
[Cebrowski] We should be willing to apply a small percentage of overall R&D funding 
for pure research ... divorced from a procurement tail. There are tremendous benefits of 
developing intellectual property that allows us a glimpse of future capabilities and trends 
without overstressing the current PPBS [Planning, Programming and Budgeting] system. 
(See response above) 
[Cochrane] Secure distributed computing platforms, resilient public network 
infrastructures, automated software creation processes based upon a formally defined object 
structures, studies of complex systems including self organisation and auto healing 
techniques. 
[Cohen] The question as put reflects on the thinking of the person asking the questions 
and in my view on the organization as a whole. 
"what specific research should it conduct?" 
"What specific technologies and methodologies should it support?" 
Specific research seems to reflect research directed toward a specific (usually operational) 
need. In my opinion, we need non-specific research into information warfare. 
Understanding specific technologies and methodologies might be a useful result that could 
be derived from the research we should be doing. I think a good start would be to fund 
research into what long-term research results we will need to be effective in IW over the 
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next 20 years. I would be very happy to do this research, but so far, the only things I 
have seen accepted by the DoD as research projects are the development of systems to 
meet specific operational needs. In other words, military R&D is in a purely reactive and 
development mode-reacting to current needs and weaknesses by developing new 
systems-rather than a proactive mode-trying to understand what future needs may be 
and trying to understand what we don't yet understand. 
[Dunnigan] People, in and out of uniform, who can do what has to be done. It's cheaper to 
cultivate the right people than to try and keep up with the commercial sector in spending. 
The money will not be there. 
[Garigue] Security is paramount, so work on trusted-objects and trusted-processes is very 
critical to information warfare. Also new ways of clustering computers together to 
augment computational power and availability is important because one can then use low 
end technology to create high end computational networks that are survivable and flexible. 
[Gust] This question needs to be asked of a combined arms team of users, researchers and 
materiel developers. One part of the community cannot answer this question alone. 
[Hazlett] Realize that there are other parties with the same interests and start working with 
them, rather than trying to "go it alone." Where possible, team with other organizations, 
such as academia, and businesses. Where it is not possible, due to unique requirement(s), 
team with consistent allies, with like needs, such as Britain, Canada, and Australia. If it 
exists elsewhere, don't be afraid to buy it, or outbid others (it may be cheaper, in the long 
run). 
[King] The emphasis should be on software and systems and not hardware. There are many 
research problems to be solved in the area of the effective, secure management of very 
large networks and systems. 
[Probst] Two things: 
- insist on programmable high-speed computers 
- insist on virtual networks connecting distributed objects with bandwidth negotiation 
[Schwartau] 
- Insular technologies for mission critical commercial infrastructures 
- Improved quality assurance 
-Post-Information Warfare technologies 
I have no doubt there's more, but I have a hell of a cold. :-) 
[Steele] The military today in the U.S.A. is something like the military in the Third 
World (Luttwak's point) in that it is one of the last true national cadres of trained, 
disciplined, loyal people. If the military would stop lying to itself and others at the 
Service and ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] level, and share wh.at it has learned 
about our vulnerabilities and gaps with the private sector, much of what we need would 
be developed at no cost to the government. Unfortunately; the areas where the military 
most needs development that will not be funded by the private sector is in the area of 
support to small Special Operations teams, and to the tactical commander dealing with 
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the 10 klick problem, and these are not massive sexy programs. The military should 
focus on "niche" R&D. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
The first set of responses to this question addressed the generic approaches the 
military should take towards "spending its R&D nickel." In general, the military should 
focus on exploiting commercial technology by teaming with non-military organizations on 
items of mutual interest. For those areas of unique2 military application, the U.S. military 
should engage in "niche" R&D in concert with traditional allied military forces in order to 
leverage combined resources. In addition, a certain portion of R&D funds should be 
focused on research not directed towards a specific application-so-called pure research 
into information warfare technologies and methodologies needed to be effective over the 
long term. 
In terms of explicit technologies which would benefit from military funding, 
participants offered the following as candidates: 
• Secure distributed computing platforms 
• Resilient public and commercial network infrastructures 
• Automated software creation processes 
• Study of complex system characteristics 
• Trusted objects, networks and processes 
• Network and parallel processing computing 
• Software and systems (vice hardware) 
2Mr. Robert Steele succinctly makes the point that battlefield applications of information warfare of 
concern to such groups as Special Operations and engaged tactical commanders will not be of much interest to 
the general commercial sector. These areas would need some direct military funding. 
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• Improved quality assurance 
• Virtual networks with bandwidth negotiation 
C. OUTSIDE THE MILITARY -INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
Engagement and interaction between the military and "traditional" defense 
companies (like Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon and Loral) has been on-going. However, 
many of the companies who deal in commercial information technology do not have a 
history of involvement with the military. Under the premise that such interaction would be 
useful, the next question asks how to conduct technology investment with such firms. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] How should the military conduct technology investment 
programs with traditionally non-defense companies (like Sun, 
Microsoft, Motorola, etc.) who are now key suppliers of information 
technology? 
[Campen) Probably not a cost-effective investment. Military has no leverage. Instead, take 
what they produce and learn how to run faster with it than the competition. 
[Cochrane] See previous replies noting that robustness is also a high priority commercial 
issue. The development of an active aggression capability may well require traditional 
military funding. 
[Cohen) The military should not be investing in those well-established commercially 
successful fums. Those firms can support themselves. The military should be putting out 
specifications for its long-range purchasing requirements to help guide the large ftrms that 
want to sell to the military so that they can make their long-term investments into the 
technologies the military will buy. The investment should be made in small high-tech 
ftrms and small high-risk high-payoff projects. 
[Dunnigan] Don't act like know-it-alls. The non-military people have more experience at 
this sort of thing. Don't be lulled by stories of commercial firms that are clueless. There 
are always lots of those. Concentrate on the commercial ouifits that have the goodies. 
[Garigue) As we evolve our traditional command and control information systems towards 
coordination, communication, and cooperation of information systems, we will be relying 
more and more on commercial key suppliers to deliver all the building blocks the military 
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will use in support of defense and national security objectives. I believe that most of our 
present military information systems problems have already available solutions. For 
example, the recent "24 hour in Cyberspace" mission control (at www .sun. com-how did 
they do it?), has a lot of the same characteristics of an advanced Information Warfare 
conunand center. It had a DMZ [De-Militarized Zone], Clean LAN [Local Area Network], 
collection, analysis, and production centers, mirrored repository sites, and CERT 
[Computer Emergency Response Team] groups. The military will have to divest itself 
from not "invented here" syndrome so it can recognize ready made solutions. Future 
technology investments might not increase the information differential so much as an 
"Information Warfare Personnel" investment program. 
[Gust] Key companies like Sun and Motorola have large divisions devoted to the 
government sector. They are coming to us. 
[Hazlett] As if they were in it as a business-getting the most bang for the buck. Provide 
incentive or seed funding to lead R&D efforts in directions of government interest. 
[King] I do not think there is any one answer here. One way is to cooperate with them in 
the funding of research at universities and research centers. It would be very useful to have 
more exchange of people between the military and these companies on rotational 
assignments but this is easier to talk about than to do. 
[Probst] Be sensitive to investments in the margin. Look for future military-critical 
technologies in small companies. 
[Schwartau] The model is the same as it is today. The Chinese Wall works. Look at the 
way that academia is handled. I don't see any conundrum here. 
[Steele] In the IW arena, "non-defense" is an oxymoron. The military has one unique 
advantage in this era-its legitimate pre-occupation with security and .survivability has 
made it sensitive to vulnerabilities and needs that are now essential for home defense and 
economic prosperity in the private sector. The military needs to~ rather than invest. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
Several participants questioned the basic premise of the subject. They felt direct 
investment with commercial information technology firms might not be worth pursuing. 
Non-defense commercial firms are doing just fine without military help and in fact they are 
coming to the military to sell their wares without any technology investment funds. Instead 
the military should concentrate on articulating where its requirements are different from 
other customers, on investing in militarily unique items and on supporting small high-tech, 
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high-payoff companies with technologies that are potentially useful for military 
applications. 
Finally, others made the point that investing dollars is not the only way to engage 
with non-defense firms. Programs to promote interaction, perhaps by expanding current 
efforts like "Education With Industry" to include exchanges with non-defense oriented 
companies and rotational assignments of business people into military groups, could do 
much to promote cooperation and an understanding of what commerce has to offer and 
what the military can use. 
D. SYNTHESIS 
Technology is a key enabler of information warfare capabilities. Advances in 
technology give the promise of even better information warfare capabilities for tomorrow. 
Such advances often stem from the research and development activities conducted 
throughout both industry and the government. With dwindling R&D funds, it is imperative 
that the military focus its efforts in ways that allow it to leverage research done in the 
commercial sector and by concentrating on uniquely military needs. 
To do such focusing requires some sort of projection of the technologies that may 
be crucial for future information warfare. Delphi members listed many candidates in this 
area and gave some recommendations as to which ones the military should support. In a 
similar vein, a recent Defense Science Board summer study listed a number of specific 
information technology areas where the commercial marketplace is not likely to focus and 
that would benefit from military investment: 
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Technologies for Enhanced. Reconfigurability 
• "Component systems" development and evaluation tools 
• Common reference models-digital terrain 
• Self-describing data models 
• Antennas 
• Low-cost digital radios 
• Dynamic information distribution 
• Application specific data compression 
Technologies for Information and Information Systems Protection 
• Automatic classification downgrading procedures 
• Tools for risk management 
• Component level authorization, authentication & access control techniques 
• Vulnerability models and metrics 
• Failure detection, containment & recovery procedures 
• Infrastructure protection mechanisms 
• Classification management for data objects 
• Data integrity techniques 
• Data contamination recovery procedures 
(Defense Science Board, 1994) 
Likewise, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board has also taken a look at 
technologies that the military (in this case, the Air Force) should support. Of interest, while 
listing specific areas for investment, the group also cited fields where the Air Force should 
.s!Q1l doing research and development in an effort to focus investment monies on truly 
"niche" product areas. Some of their suggestions for technologies to stop focusing on 
include: 
• Software development of software tools 
• Mandatory use of Ada 
• High capacity communications "backbones" 
• Cryptography routinely embedded in systems 
• Multimedia technologies 
• Natural language understanding 
• Computer displays 
• "Information broker'' software 
• Basic directed-action software agents 
• Software for "business" functions 
(Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 1995) 
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Besides looking at specific areas to support and particular efforts not to support, 
there is one additional way to look at the question of identifying the important information 
warfare technologies of the future. That is to describe the desired attributes of future 
systems and then to support militarily unique research that promote those attributes. For 
example (this is not an inclusive list), one might wish that the information warfare 
technologies of tomorrow be faster, smaller, robust, reliable, secure, fault tolerant, handle 
large amounts of data, and have a superior user interface. Working backwards from such a 
"feature set" can help to guide the R&D investments of today. 
In sum, sowing the seeds for tomorrow's information warfare technology will 
mainly require that the military engage with the world-wide commercial sector for the 
technologies that will satisfy a large portion of military needs. An .important part of this 
engagement will be "cross-fertilization" between the military and civilian worlds. One 
reason this cross-fertilization is needed is so the military can learn how the commercial 
world operates and what it has to offer. The other reason is for the military to communicate 
its own desires and needs to promote understanding of military requirements among the 
non-defense firms. Then the U.S. military (most likely in cooperation with allies) would 
then be free to spend its own limited R&D funds on "investments in the margins" to 
address novel military requirements that are not likely to be met by commercial 
developments. 
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VI. AN INFORMATION AGE ACQUISITION ORGANIZATION 
The prior acceptance and application of the thesis that superior arms favor victory, while 
essential, are insufficient unless the "superior arms" are accompanied by a military 
doctrine of strategic or tactical application which provides for full exploitation of the 
innovations. But even doctrine is inadequate without an organization to administer the 
tasks involved in selecting, testing, and evaluating "inventions." The history of weapons 
in the United States is ftlled with evidence on this point. [Emphasis added] 
-I. B. Holley Jr. 
The movement of the military to embrace information warfare has already had 
obvious organizational impacts in the operational world. All of the services have 
established information warfare centers or activities, warfighting Commanders-In-Chief 
(CINCs) have developed information warfare cells and the Air Force is even in the process 
of standing-up an "information warfare squadron." This chapter seeks to explore whether 
military institutionalization of information warfare also implies the need for organizational 
changes in the development and procurement agencies. 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
One of the traditionally key organizational issues is the debate between 
centralization and decentralization. Centralization usually offers tighter control, economies 
of scale and a more "top down" management approach-as well as a reputation for 
excessive slowness, bureaucracy and lack of innovation. On the other hand, 
decentralization offers the promise of a flattened hierarchy, more accountability and 
increased flexibility, at the risk of loss of focus and control (Daft, 1995). But with the 
advent of information technologies, an organization might be able to overcome any 
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problems of decentralization with robust communication between the various parts. Thus 
this question seeks in several different ways to explore the appropriateness of acquisition 
decentralization. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Should the procurement of information technologies be 
decentralized? Should procurement funds be given to the unified 
commands (e.g., Pacific Command) and/or individual units instead of 
the individual services (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force)? Or is a "joint" 
acquisition organization (perhaps similar to the Strategic Defense 
Initiative Office) more appropriate? 
[Campen] The framing of this question still implies a focus on THINGS. Information 
services should be established by functional basic ordering agreements that apply to 
similar functions in all services, on a global basis. Individual units then access these 
information services essentially the way they now do food and water, paying a users fee, 
if necessary, to support a common industrial fund. Using Intelligence as an example, 
DISA [Defense Information Systems Agency] provides the communications protocols and 
controls the network at the operational level; functional activities, such as DIA, NSA and 
CIA provide the functionally tailored information services, and the user taps into the 
system as required. 
[Cebrowsld] The spirit of Goldwater-Nichols and other mechanisms address these issues in 
that: a.) CINCs have more input in defining warfighting requirements-which is 
inherently decentralized b.) Operational units have significant latitude to apply 
discretionary funds in a manner that best meets their needs, and c.) The Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council ensures maximum warjighting efficiency by validating 
and articulating requirements to the Defense Acquisition Board-in essence, they embody 
the necessary ingredients of a joint acquisition organization. I prefer joint and (jgcentralized 
to reinventing communism. 
[Cochrane] Speaking from experience of a commercial organisation, decentralisation 
causes problems. A decentralised organisation results in a plethora of systems performing 
the same job in different location, on different platforms written in different languages. A 
centralised approach should provide a coordinated approach but needs to be fast and give 
the flexibility in the field. However, care must be taken to ensure centralisation does not 
bring the disadvantages of complete standardisation. If an organisation were to standardise 
on a particular type of hardware, it would be completely compromised if the hardware 
were to suffer a serious security breach. Are there any reasons for each service to procure 
information systems separately, let alone each unit? I would think that the needs of one 
type of military organisation are pretty much the same as the other. One absolute 
necessity is that the systems should interwork searnlessly. It would also be nice to think 
that a marine defending an army base should be able to use their equipment in the same 
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way as his own kit. If each service can not work with each other then the game could be 
lost before it starts! ! ! ! ! 
[Cohen] Centralized planning-decentralized execution. The price and terms should be 
negotiated on a DoD-wide contract to minimize costs. The specific equipment should be 
ordered and processed by the most local person needing it. The acquisition should be based 
on an established need and method for fulfilling that need identified to and approved by the 
chain of command. 
[Dunnigan] It already is decentralized. Lotsa luck separating the individual eggs from that 
omelet now. 
[Garigue] The question of centralized vs. decentralized organizational structure is a big 
debate and an essential one. The money should go where the knowledge is. Who knows 
best should decide. Certainly the architecture and the standards could be centralized and the 
acquisition and the procurement can be decentralized. But in the case of very large 
organizations such as the Army, Navy, etc., the question cannot be resolved because all 
organizations have enough capabilities and resource to suffice to their own needs. None 
will agree on either solution. So the debate will continue. 
[Giessler] Decentralized? Yes. Procurement funds given to unified commands and/or 
individual units? Yes for most I.T., only unique non-COTS stuff should be centralized. Is 
a "joint" acquisition organization more appropriate? Only for unique stuff and that should 
be less than 5 percent 
· 
[Gust] We have had CINC-initiatives with discretionary funds for many years. It has 
resulted in some duplicative procurement and some non-interoperability horror stories. 
One cannot even specify UNIX without some disconnect across that product line. I think 
some centralization at the Service level is appropriate, mainly because that is where the 
best handling of funding and most flexibility in any reallocation or reprogramming of 
funds occurs. A joint activity carries too much baggage. My latest and most perplexing 
problem is to try to start a new common intell broadcast receiver program without a 
finalized joint ORD [Operational Requirements Document]. I have FY 96 dollars that 
must be spent, but the joint ORD approval process, which requires CINCS' coordination, 
will take so much time as to be in the next .fiscal year. Jointness in buying JTIDS [Joint 
Tactical Information Distribution System], GPS, MILSTAR are three examples where 
time was traded for joint coordination, but Services retained the dollars on these programs. 
That is probably the best way to go. 
[Hazlett] Should be more coordinated, not less. Particularly important from an 
affordability viewpoint. There is little overlap today between the services, even where 
there are similar, or even identical requirements. Virtual organization concept has merit in 
the acquisition world. Services, CINCs, etc., should form temporary virtual alliances 
when like needs exist, or joint development makes sense. One large acquisition 
organization may be too unwieldy. 
[King] The goal should be to make the procurement process as efficient as possible. 
Something like a central group that prepares specifications and bid guidelines and then 
each command doing its own actual acquisition. 
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[Loescher] I would go further. ALL organizations, including tactical organizations, will be 
streamlined. Modem command is about moving information to take advantage of 
openings that happen orders of magnitude faster -and further from the tactical operations 
area-than war in the past. The officer hierarchy structure is a reflection of 19th Century 
land warfare and 20th Century ricebowls. With respect to development, a centralized, 
much smaller, Service-specific R&D outfit with ties to industry labs and Universities is 
the way to go, at least for the next 5-8 years. Government employees· at the mid-level 
cannot stay in touch with commercial technology to buy it properly; but they can be 
focused on Service unique problems, which are not insignificant. Procurement of 
information systems should be decentralized; procurement of large information pools may 
be better bundled. 
A joint office, just means, joint bureaucrats. What we need are new ideas to create new 
markets for new industry to sell to us-not more bureaucrats to oversee the existing 
industry, which is a reflection of yesterday's acquisition. 
[Probst] Definitely, but interoperability can be guaranteed. But management gurus are not 
to be blindly trusted. 
[Steele] Yes and no. Local authority over the realignment of funds is critical. For 
instance, PACOM [Pacific Command] briefed me several years ago that they had hundreds 
of thousands of dollars earmarked for TEMPEST hardware they did not need, and zero 
dollars for open source collection and production (including their library), so they had to 
cancel their LEXIS-NEXIS account. Generally the local command knows its needs best. 
HOWEVER, the current system of penalizing commmids for savings is out of touch with 
human nature. They should be allowed to roll saving ·overs and reinvest in other 
priorities. Joint mandates of specific systems and software will produce results as dumb as 
the Marine Corps suite, where one word processor is mandated and purchased, and ignored 
Corps-wide, while WordPerfect is bought by hook or crook and is the actual Corps 
standard 
[Todd] Realizing the short term focus ofthe Unified Commands, the truly "out ofthe 
box" thinking has come more from technology push from the Services (stealth as an 
example) than from requirement pull from the Unified Staffs. Of course, I realize this is 
an iterative process and the integrated priority lists are of significant value to identifying 
what to pursue technology wise. Likewise, a joint office has its place in a very restrictive 
role. The Services should retain their junction in the R&D arena. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
There are two basic threads to this topic-the centralized versus decentralized issue 
and the question of a joint acquisition organization. In .response to the first issue, Delphi 
members favored a "centralized planning, decentralized execution" approach. Such 
activities as procurement of information pools or services, devel~pment of convenient 
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contract purchase vehicles and setting of joint standards I and architectures would all best be 
centralized. While most of the actual funds to order products and information services 
should be decentralized to the level where the users possess the best knowledge of what is 
required. Then within a standard architectural umbrella, units or CINCs would be able to 
order what they need either from central purchase contracts or directly from the commercial 
world. 
The second issue is whether a joint acquisition organization for buying information 
technologies would be appropriate or useful. The consensus was that joint organizations 
have a place for limited and specific purposes and programs. But in general, individual 
services should retain their functions of developing new military-unique technologies (the 
so-called "technological push") and of "equipping," albeit in ways that ensure 
interoperability with other services and allies. Such interoperability will mainly be assured 
by common standards and architectures-although it is unclear exactly who2 would set 
these standards or develop the architectures. 
Finally, Mr. James Hazlett brings up the idea of "virtual" acquisition organizations. 
Under this concept, individuals from diverse organizations (users, acquirers, contractors, 
different services, etc.) would come together to form ad hoc alliances to address specific 
I A note of caution is required here. As one participant warned, one must be careful not to suffer the 
disadvantages of complete standardization, which can inhibit innovation, technological progress and 
competition. More worrisome, from a defensive information warfare perspective, is that standardization can 
make the overall system or network more vulnerable to a single type of attack, while a diversity of systems 
gives some inherent protection (Stoll, 1989). Probably more important than standardization of hardware or 
operating systems is an insistence on interoperability between different commercial products. 
20ne suggestion is that the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, via the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council, should be responsible for developing an architectural "building code" (Defense Budget 
Project, 1995). Another possibility is the use of the Technical Architecture Framework for Information 
Management (T AFIM) maintained by DISA-which is designed to provide a single framework for DoD 
information systems (Paige, 1995). 
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needs or collaborate on individual programs. Modern information technologies such as 
video-teleconferencing, electronic mailing lists and the World Wide Web have enabled the 
creation of such entities and allow them to function in ways that are independent of normal 
time and space considerations3. 
B. UNIT-LEVEL ACQUIRERS 
If the acquisition of information technologies is decentralized to levels closer to the 
user, does this imply the need for a new kind of expertise at the lower levels? Is 
someone-perhaps called an "acquisition technologist"-needed who has the skills to 
properly apply standards and architectures, buy the services or syste:ffis and integrate it all 
into a joint system of systems that supports warfighter needs? 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Should "acquisition technologists" be put in operational 
units in order to quickly acquire and transition new capabilities? 
[Cebrowski] This is more a matter of process and education ~han one of organization. 
[Cochrane] Three options depending upon how you define information warfare. 
- Moving operational people to the technologists would be far less dangerous for everyone 
involved. Technologists could get military requirements for systems in the same way that 
they acquire requirements for commercial systems. When getting new kit into the field I 
would think operational personnel would be happier learning from their peers who know 
the problems of operating in the field rather than suits from computer companies. 
- As new information warfare technology can change the face of a battlefield within hours 
it may be necessary for IW units to contain not only acquisition technologists but also 
their own front-line research and development teams. 
3So instead of a user in Korea having to spend travel funds to go to a program review in the United States, 
he could pull the review's briefing slides off a web site. Or if an engineer on the West Coast needs the opinion 
of a user in Europe, he can send an electronic message and not have to worry about getting up at 0500 to make a 
telephone call across multiple time zones. Granted, such vicarious interaction does lack the human touch, so 
there will still be times when travel is required for face-to-face meetings. 
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- Since information warfare creates a whole new battle field, cyberspace, it creates a need for people that understand warfare to work closely with technology gurus. 
[Cohen] No. The person who actually needs a particular piece of technology should be 
able to go and get it if they want to, but it should be a pre-approved item or technology 
(except on an emergency basis) from a pre-approved source at a pre-approved price. 
[Dunnigan] Put them somewhere out of the way so that the end user organizations can go 
get what they feel they need. 
· 
[Garigue] The logistics officer should be able to buy anything-putting it together is 
another issue. There needs to be a Information System Officer for that. With new 
technologies there are new classes of specialists that are required. In the navy we went 
from sail to steam, with this a new officer cane into the wardroom, then with electricity 
came another type of officer, now with software becoming the dominant war technology 
there will be the requirement for a new specialty in the military. 
[Giessler] Yes-but that will happen when we select people who think and have an I.W. 
paradigm and educate them at NPS andAFIT [Air Force Institute of Technology] and all 
PME [Professional Military Education] at all levels. The Thrashers and Elams and Garcias 
are already the info science and technology officers and officials. All we need to do is get 
out of their way. And Comdr Loescher is leading that effort at USN heatkjuarters. 
[Gust] The Army still uses its TRADOC organization as the "user's rep" to consolidate 
requirements. The last thing we need is for each Army division to buy its own technology 
and then have to join up in a large force side-by-side like in Desert Storm. If you want it 
bad, you'll get it bad. 
[Hazlett] Should stand up several joint and single service organizational and technological 
testbed units whose manning includes acquisition technologists. Not sure that they really 
belong or can be kept gainfully employed in regular operational units. 
[King] I would centralize the technology part of this and distribute only the actual 
acquisition part. 
[Loescher] In the current model-buying systems vs. commodities-we are wasting our 
money. Decentralizing acquisition to buy systems decentralizes wasting of money. We 
need to get our heads out of hardware and software and into information. We don't need 
acquisition technologists then, we need at new kind of operator, who understands infotech 
as the technology of modern warjighter. He/she needs to take their places beside the 
aviation, armored, strategic bombing, etc, innovators of the 1920s to lead us into a 
different kind of warfare. 
[Probst] I think so. Maybe not an operational unit strictly speaking. 
[Steele] Acquisition is NOT an arcane specialty that requires magic incantations and 
special knowledge. That is the OW acquisition paradigm where convoluted formulas had 
to be learned over years of study and practice simply to stay out ofjail. The new paradigm 
should rely on open market viability and common sense. 
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2. Commonalities and Differences 
Perhaps the best summation of the Delphi members thoughts on this question is that 
what is required in the operational units are individuals who have an understanding of the 
promises and pitfalls of information technologies-perhaps "information technologist" 
would be a better descriptive term. The actual "acquiring" of information services or 
systems may be the easy part, with the true difficulties lying in the areas of understanding 
technology, defining requirements, proper integration and appropriate use. Such 
individuals must also serve in a "translator'' function that takes the n.eeds of the warfighter 
and transforms them into requirements addressable by information technology solutions 
(Allard, 8 March 1996). 
C. ACQUISITION COMMUNITY FOCUS 
Much of the information technology procured by the military today is available off-
the-shelf from commercial firms. Given the relative ease of acquiring commercial products, 
does this imply a need for a change in where the acquisition community aims its own 
organizational efforts? 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] With the focus on use of commercial products, where should 
the military acquisition organization concentrate its focus?. Research and 
development? Management of contracts and contractors? Integration of 
systems? Development of interfaces and architeCtures? 
[Campen] Assuming we need but a very small one, its focus should be on architectures, 
integration and interfaces, and continuity of service. 
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[Cebrowski] It should focus on simplification, outsourcing, teaming with suppliers, and 
making itself as small as possible. 
[Cochrane] There is no simple answer to this: well defined architecture and interfaces are 
essential for rapid systems integration and reliability. However, continuous changes in the 
battlefield can only be met with new technology provided from a well funded and broad 
based research programme. 
[Cohen] No. Yes. No. No. 
[Dunnigan] If you buy in sufficient quantity, you can have a partial production run 
modified to your particular needs. This is done all the time. But you have to act like 
commercial purchasing operations (i.e., efficiently.) 
[Garigue] Acquisition organizations should focus on shorter acquisition cycles and rapid 
distribution. 
[Giessler] Most of it should go away but that which is left should either be a 
demonstration center which shows off commercially available products and what will 
soon be available or it should be acquiring unique stuff. The acquisition field must 
change. Research and development? Not much here and most of this should be done across 
service if not at the JCS/OSD [Joint Chiefs of Staff/Office of the Secretary of Defense] 
levels. Management of contracts and contractors? Local user goes out and buys COTS and 
support necessary-that will be different for each user and may change when someone 
arrives, then leaves a job. Integration of systems? The local group will decide if they are 
competent to create interoperability and integration software, hardware, management ware, 
etc. If not they will hire it done for the 12 to 18 months before they buy new stuff. Some 
parts of their info system will always be changing by their COTS buys. Development of 
interfaces and architectures? The C.O. [Commanding Officer] has ti:ie vision and his 
people either develop or hire or buy the interfaces that will allow them to do the job with 
their constantly adapting architectures. 
[Gust] I think the focus has to be on all frontiers, none at the exclusion ofthe others. We just have to be cognizant of what the other players are doing. 
[Hazlett] Military acquisition organizations should concentrate their efforts on identifying 
those areas where the military can best benefit from economies of scale and on identifying 
and coordinating the management of cross-organization and organization unique needs. 
[King] R&D to keep abreast of changes and development of interfaces and architectures in 
order to provide the acquisition guidelines. 
[Loescher] The first two. There are many Service-unique or at least military-unique R&D 
problems that will never be solved in industry. Secondly, we need to create a process at 
the contracting level to capture innovation and to learn how to pay for information, which 
is different than paying for torpedoes. 
[Probst] DoD does almost no research itself, and not much more development. DoD labs 
are quite different from DoE labs. Only options two and three are feasible. 
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[Schwartau] R&D for basic technology yes, in cooperation with the private sector, more 
along the European model. Standards are the key. I bet my bottom dollar that in a contest, 
a commercial outfit could get a system up and running much faster ·than a burdened 
military structure given the same tasking orders. The commercial folks would pick and 
choose available parts and glue them together for fast functionality. For military 
applications, a hardening step would be required, especially for mission critical life/death 
systems. 
[Steele] There are always going to be some areas where the private sector simply will not 
support the kind of R&D that is necessary for unique military requirements. In the C31 
area: 
- Tactical document acquisition and digitization (such as rapid and rugged scanning of 
rough documents that are crumpled, wet, and hard to read; take on non-trivial pattern 
recognition problems 
-Automated time and space tags on all multi-media information 
-Build the bridges from commercial remote sensing platforms to the NRO/GPS precision 
points and then return the production of 1:50,000 combat charts with contour lines to the 
private sector- also build the bridges from commercial imagery through GPS/NRO to 
precision munitions already mounted on aircraft 
-Digitize interactive speech for military police, coalition command & control, prisoner 
interrogation 
- Communications & computing security 
[Todd] The military should concentrate on integrating those systems deemed necessary to 
having a positive impact on the information battlespace. Knowing and having reliable 
information on our own forces; then being able to acquire, mix, synthesize and distribute 
information about our adversaries; then being about to orchestrate truly coherent 
operations against the enemy will have the greatest impact in future conflicts. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
There was little convergence in the answers to this question. While there was a 
strong feeling that the role of the acquisition community should be small and simplified, the 
members split on what the exact focus should be. Some felt that conducting military unique 
R&D was a proper role, while others argued that the DoD really does little R&D itself and 
merely outsources research to others. Others felt that contract management would be a key 
activity of the acquisition community, but one member argued that local users should be 
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able to do this themselves. Likewise for the integration of systems and the development of 
architectures and standards. Several members thought these were proper functions while 
several more members said that the users could best integrate systems and develop their 
own architectures based on commercial standards. 
Finally, Dr. Fred Giessler suggested that an appropriate role for the acquisition 
community would be to run information technology "demonstration centers." Such 
demonstration centers would highlight newly available or soon to be available commercial 
items so that the individual users have a means to keep up with the latest technology. 
D. INSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS 
Although not strictly an acquisition organizational question, this issue seeks to 
explore the existence and nature of any built-in obstacles to the development of an 
information warfare "infrastructure." 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] What are the institutional impediments to the creation of an 
information warfare infrastructure? 
[Campen] Trying to adapt a structure built to buy, field, install, maintain THINGS into 
one needed to obtain information services. As the Congress noted in passing the new 
rules for acquisition of information technology, the hardest thing to change will be the 
culture. 
[Cebrowski] The infrastructure already exists-what's needed is more time and effort for 
intellectual maturity. 
[Cochrane] Impediments to the creation of an information warfare infrastructure. 
- Military and governmental establishments and those that derive power from their 
positions in such organisations. 
- The acquisition agencies with their preferences and cozy relationships with the "safe" 
traditional suppliers. 
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- Selling the concept to the public. If you say that there is a need for information security 
improvements the implication is that systems are insecure. No one wants to admit to 
problems, they just want to sort them out on the quiet, the result is that knowledge is not 
shared. The public are also quick to see a conspiracy and think that faceless governments 
are going to use the systems to further their own aims. 
[Cohen] Were there any? 
[Dunnigan] Stepping on someone else's toes. 
[Garigue] The mind set. Cyberspace is not seen as a possible battlespace. 
[Giessler] The most difficult is to get national security operatives at all levels to drop 
their old paradigms. The infrastructure is an implicit one that bas to be inculcated not 
defined. It bas to be part of the control system of individuals and organizations who 
understand the goals, objectives and CO's that capitalize on the COTS technologies-and 
then educate, train and exercise the force to create a revolution in military affairs. 
[Gust] Everyone wants to be in charge. How many times have we have a new initiative 
and one Service has jumped up to lead so that their service-unique views or needs are 
served first? Examples are UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles], strategic defense, space-
related technology. We cannot all be the leaders, and the leaders have to be more 
accommodating of the needs of the other services. The followers also cannot be too 
parochial in their demands for "all or nothing" type solutions. 
[Hazlett] Rice bowls and service rivalry, primarily. The services have been way too quick 
in carving up IW into narrowly defined areas. Some IW areas can best be handled in 
concert, rather than singularly. 
[King] Information warfare is much more abstract than conventional warfare and it will be 
harder to get people to think about (and fund) it. In order to successfully control a 
networked nation it will probably be necessary to increase the security and therefore the 
restrictions. This goes against the current "open" atmosphere. 
[Loescher] Institutions. You cannot create a new kind of warfare with old stovepipe 
warriors. But the stovepipe warriors control promotions-until we find a means to 
truncate the dynasties or until the dynasties tragically prove their unsuitability to the new 
world. Historical examples are everywhere, from the Trenches of WW I to Battleship 
Admirals to today's Information W arfare-wbicb is basically cryptology .reinventing itself 
in the guise of new term. There is a new Information Warfare, absolutely, but you won't 
get there by renaming the past, which is Navy's current mistake. 
[Probst] Established privilege. Empire building. Lack of agreed-on concepts. 
[Schwartau] I do not know what an IW infrastructure means here. I could interpret this a 
dozen different ways. Sorry. 
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[Steele] The institutional leaders below the Secretary of Defense. ACTUAL-the 
classification of the threat. The games Navy plays to compartment IW simply to keep its 
own toys and avoid joint endeavors. The general lack of understanding at the flag level of 
· why intelligence is broken and open sources are a major part of the IW fix. The 
unwillingness of ASD C31 [Assistant Secretary of Defense for C31] to stand tall and tell 
it like it is... 
· 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
Several different threads emerge from the comments on this issue. First, that it will 
be difficult to adapt structures made for the acquisition of things into the structures needed 
to acquire information services. Second, that the military services have started to stake out 
narrowly defined portions of information warfare and are moving in directions that 
(naturally) serve service interests first-perhaps at the expense of the whole. Third, the 
sometimes abstract and ill-defined nature of information warfare makes it hard to articulate 
the threat in ways that garner support and funding from both inside and outside the DoD. 
The last impediment mentioned is the possible resistance to information warfare 
from the current warfare-specialty stovepipes. The solution to this problem, as articulated 
by Dr. Stephen Rosen in Winning the Next War, is for leaders with traditional warfare 
credentials to support and reward those who would practice a new method of warfare-in 
this case information warfare (Rosen, 1991). 
E. SYNTHESIS 
Some of the inherent characteristics of information technology may make possible 
changes in the organizational structure of how information systems or services are 
acquired. A good analogy might be the current way telephone services are handled. Based 
on commercial standards, local users determine their own requirements and then telephone 
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specialists at the local level are free to buy, install and support their own equipment and 
services to meet the user's needs. There are obvious flaws to this analogy since there is 
currently no monopolistic "Ma Bell" to develop the basic information technology standards 
and it is not clear that this approach will scale well to the entire range of information 
technologies now available. But perhaps this model is a worthy goal. If a good portion of 
the technology is mature enough and if the standards and technical frameworks are 
available, then acquisition of specific information technologies can be "pushed down" to 
levels closer to the warfighters. Then systems will be seen more as "information 
appliances" and information services as no different than signing up 'for telephone service. 
Promoting the activities that enable this type of decentralization may be a key role of the 
acquisition world. 
Such activities would include the continuation of R&D for military-unique issues, 
support for the development of both DoD4 and commercial standards and architectures, 
development of convenient contract purchase vehicles and the demonstration of new 
technologies as a way to educate users as to what is available. The organization to do this 
may not be that structurally different from today, although it might be greatly simplified and 
streamlined. Instead, it may promote and lead ad hoc alliances to address specific needs or 
collaborate on individual programs using modem information technologies such as video-
teleconferencing, electronic mailing lists and the World Wide Web. 
All of this decentralization implies a need for individuals with greater expertise at 
the user level in order to acquire, integrate and sometimes operate information technologies. 
4The development of DoD-wide standards and architectures (partially based on commercial standards) will be 
key to avoiding interoperability problems between the services and commercial entities. 
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Mr. James Hazlett and Dr. Martin Libicki call these individuals "information warriors" and 
they recommend the following as required areas of expertise: 
The information warrior must know not only programming but systems integration and 
system theory, communications, security, artificial intelligence, logic in all its many 
forms (classical, fuzzy, and convergent), and statistical techniques. The information 
warrior must also know the customer's needs: the commander's intent, doctrine, and 
strategies. (Hazlett & Libicld, Autumn 1993) 
Given the broad range of expertises listed above, growing individuals with even 
some of these skills looks to be a difficult task. While many of these competencies have 
been the purview of users (i.e., understanding the commander's intent, doctrine, etc.), 
others have been more traditionally associated with engineers and scientists, the bulk of 
which are located in the acquisition and research organizations. Most likely such 
"information warriors" will be drawn from both talent pools to accomplish the tasks of 
acquiring information services or systems, understanding new technology, translating the 
needs of the warfighter, defining requirements, and integrating systems into a larger whole. 
Finally there is the question of "institutional impediments" to the development of 
information warfare capabilities. Chief among these may be the bias. towards the one-time· 
procurement of large systems designed over years and 'expected to last over years and 
sometime decades, as opposed to the incremental development and enhancement of smaller 
systems and the procurement of information services (Loescher). Colonel Ken Allard of the 
National Defense University lists several others in a recent article. where he talks about 
"living up to [the] technological promise" of information warfare: 
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Although the defense budget is the most obvious constraint, there are other institutional 
impediments as well. Among them: the continuing struggle to temper the services' 
tendency to pursue separate modernization paths and the parallel need to rationalize the 
5,000 separate C3 systems current operated by the DoD. Not only are these systems 
expensive, they are a form of self-inflicted information warfare whenever we conduct joint 
operations ... Further acquisition reform is a related challenge. While significant 
improvement in commercial-military integration have been enacted, their implementation 
through the FAR has been slow. And it may well take a generation to product a defense 
acquisition work force skilled in sophisticated surveillance of the commercial marketplace 
and capable of entrepreneurial risk-taking. (Allard, 4 March 1996) 
Progress in all of these areas will doubtless be slow given the nature of large and 
sometimes competing institutions. In addition, several of these impediments are more 
procedural than organizational, and will be examined more in the next chapter. 
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VII. CHANGES IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The survival of nations or even of whole cultures may depend upon the ability to procure 
superior weapons. It behooves us to be certain that our system is adequate to ensure this 
superiority. 
- I. B. Holley Jr. 
Acquisition of weapons has long been an important part of a nation's military 
strength. Even the ancient Greeks recognized the importance of "acquisition." In Greek 
mythology, a separate deity-Vulcan-was dedicated to the development of tools for use in 
war and it was his task to forge the lightning bolts for Zeus to use in conflict. Today, raw 
information warfare technology must be developed, acquired, or "forged" into a form 
useful to current warriors. But do the defining characteristics of information warfare imply 
changes in how the U.S. should acquire or "forge" information warfare services and 
systems? 
A. CYCLE TIMES 
One of the traditional criticisms of the acquisition system is that it takes far too long 
to develop and field advanced systems. Lags of years between program initiation and start 
of field delivery are not uncommon (Dupont, 1996). These lags can result in military 
systems that are far less than cutting edge. This problem is exacerbated by the rapid pace of 
information technology development, which coupled with generally widespread 
commercial availability of such technology, creates the danger of potential opponents 
"getting inside our acquisition cycle" when they are not constrained by a formal · 
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procurement system. This questions probes how the acquisition cycle might be speeded up 
to avoid such a situation. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Given that new generations of commercial information 
technology come, by some accounts, every 18 months, bow do we 
address the need for a quick acquisition cycle time? 
[Campen] We begin by abandoning the term "cycle," or at least redefine it as an open-
ended, never-ending series of cycles. Also, we rid ourselves of the obsolescent concept 
that we are "buying a system." It has been almost 20 years since an AFCEA [Armed 
Forces Communications and Electronics Association]-run study coined the phrase 
"evolutionary acquisition" in an effort to make the point that there is never a Final 
Operational Capability, only a series of buy a little, test a little increments. The DoD 
Authorization Act of 1996 (HR 1530) makes some useful changes by focusing oversight 
on the function of an organization and the outputs to be gained from new information 
technology, and by urging "modular, incremental" procurements .of "information 
technology." But that is not nearly enough for the U.S. to avoid being technically leap-
frogged by adversaries that are not crippled by machine-age procurement regulations and 
cultures, nor burdened with an enormous investment in obsolete legacy systems. I think 
Navy Commander Loescher is the one to credit with the notion that we no longer procure 
information systems; instead, we acquire information services. (My words, his idea). We 
need to visualize the continuous enhancement of information systems in much the same 
way that we do software upgrades. We know there is always a software revision on the 
horizon and we program funds accordingly. The Block approach to aircraft upgrades is a 
step in this direction, but it can't be done if each increment must be refought with the 
Congress annually. We don't approach Congress with a line item to purchase electricity 
or water and we ought not need one to purchase INFORMATION SERVICES. 
[Cebrowski] Spirited debate surrounding DoD Acquisition reform is not new. However, 
the strategic environment has changed so significantly since the inception of the current 
acquisition system that modernization is clearly warranted. A revitalized acquisition 
system that can keep pace with market forces is the surest way to maintain the most 
modern weapons systems. The focus should be on capabilities, not systems. The strategy 
should be one of continuous incremental technology insertion. 
[Cochrane] The characteristics of information warfare dictate that a new software or 
network tool can provide battlefield advantage within hours of its conception. Therefore · 
the research, development and supply chains will require re-engineering to suit. 
Commercial information technology may go through a generation in less than two years 
but changes in the fundamental platform and network architectures are much slower. 
Possession of the very latest technology will be critical to front-line Information Warfare 
units. More conventional units with less pressing needs could easily be supplied by 
normal commercial processes. Above all the growth in computing ability has to be 
allowed for when designing systems and then factoring extra security on top to be safe. 
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[Cohen] New IT doesn't often mean new underlying uses or techniques-they come far 
more slowly. Furthermore, for the first 6 months or so, any environment is unstable. The 
strategy should be to seek out more stable environments for conditions where long-term 
results are desired-hence you go for Unix and MVS and VMS and other stable 
environments as opposed to DOS and WINDOWS, etc [Note: these are all different types 
of computer operating systems]. Furthermore, re-acquiring technology every 18 months is 
not cost effective. Seek out technology that will last for 5-8 years and build on the more 
stable base. Abandon the reckless approach in favor of the more solid one. The exception 
is in experimental environments, where the state-of-the-art should be tracked, and in 
special cases where a really new capability enables advantages that are so significant that 
they warrant the extremely increased likelihood of failure associated with new technology. 
[Dunnigan] Go commercial or die. Your likely future opponents will not have a military-
industrial complex and will automatically go commercial and have the latest stuff. 
[Garigue] Our present notion of information system delivery is outdated. We do not 
deliver systems anymore, we "grow" them. The present maturity of IT permits an 
organization to adopt a "technology insertion" strategy rather than a system development 
strategy. As new generation of network components are made available we can insert 
them readily into existing networks and IT infrastructures. We introduce these 
components in a prototyping context. 
The focal point however is not just on managing the technology but on managing the 
functionality. As functions have a longer cycle than technology we mu'st ensure that we 
outline a migration ofthe stable functions embedded in older technology to the new ones. 
We must also ensure that such a migration path will ensure the minimal amount of 
disruption of service over the course of the transition. This way, over time, older 
technology elements of a network are replaced by newer ones and functions migrate from 
older hosts to newer ones. 
[Giessler] Adopt USN [U.S. Navy] initiative and SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] dictate 
that COTS is standard unless otherwise strongly justified. 
[Gust] We have now begun in the PEO [Program Executive Officer] world an earnest 
reduction in cycle time. RFPs [Requests for Proposal] are shorter, with fewer CDRLs 
[Contract Data Requirements List], minimal MILSTDs [Military Standards] for such 
items as comm waveforms, interoperability, etc. Contract negotiations are now including 
an oral discussion cycle instead of lengthy IFBs [Invitation for Bid] exchanges ofwriuen 
questions and answers, etc. But still if the new technology cycle is 18 months, we have 
to do more. One initiative is the POM [Program Objective Memorandum] wedge for 
unidentified new initiatives. Our Army Chief is asking the Congress.for $450M in a 
wedge to buy the mature, value-added successes from the digitization demo. Another is for 
the Army TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] community to emphasize a 
reduction in their requirements determination cycle. There are still areas where we can 
reduce time. 
[Hazlett] Lean toward software, vice hardware solutions, ensuring that hardware is easily 
upgradeable, taking advantage of more powerful chips and faster memory. Go to more 
modular systems. 
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[King] First, it is not necessary to always keep up with every new wave of products 
which is more alike every six months. Second, long term contracts should be developed 
with vendors who can provide upgrades and new systems over the life of the contract in an 
efficient manner. 
[Loescher] There is a logic set here that we are missing consistently. The InfoTech 
industry, at this moment, appears to be growing much like the oil industry, automobile 
industry, power industry, and other markets initiated by broad change in technology. A 
global infrastructure is being built as the market for goods increases. We are still in the 
stage where the industry is dominated by engineers, who are attempting to sell specific 
products. It is analogous to trying to sell spark plugs instead of cars. Gradually, however, 
the market is becoming one of commodity and service-America Online, Netscape, Java, 
are all examples of the coming service market. In the future, I would bet acquisition time 
will become irrelevant-because we're not going to "acquire" it, we're going to buy 
information services and information itself as a commodity. Acquisition won't 
matter-C41 is dead; we'll be transitioning to the direct use of information itself, not 
building information systems, which will all be commerCial-and perhaps common to 
the foe and the friend. 
[Probst] Use ATDs [Advanced Technology Demonstrations]. 
[Schwartau] In basic COTS PCs this is true, but integration of complex systems requires 
greater development and testing time. The key here is platform and 0/S [Operating 
Systems] standards, backward compatibility and an acquisition awareness that what is 
RFI'd [Request for Information] today is obsolete by the time the buy occurs. I would 
examine acquisitions which permit the upgrade of systems performance to current 
standards as of the date of purchase. 
[Steele] Functional standards (as opposed to fixed standards), and true openness and inter-
operability, are critical. HOWEVER, also critical are the identification and legislation of 
standards of security and other basic forms of functionality which must be embedded in all 
civil communications and computing capabilities in as much as 95% of DoD traffic goes 
over same. It is NOT possible to BUY what we need. It is only possible to LEASE, 
TEMPORARILY. civil capabilities in this area. The real progress will come not from 
jirewalling internal unilateral systems, but from raising the generic security and capability 
of the ENI'IRE global network. 
[Todd] In the past, the U.S. military has done a dismal job of integrating information 
systems. That, however, has been a blessing in disguise in that our "system of systems" 
have not been susceptible to contamination (either malicious or accidental). But future 
systems should be easier to integrate and as such, we need to ensure these systems while 
acting independent are yet able to communicate among them (linked).' Fully integrated 
systems may be like a house of cards and if attacked, not degrade gracefully. 
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2. Commonalities and Differences 
The general answer to this question is that one should no longer worry about the 
acquisition of systems. Instead the focus should be on managing the functionst that make 
up the system and on the information services that are required by the user. For the former, 
technology upgrades should occur by an evolutionary "growing" of the overall system by 
migrating functions hosted in old technology to newer technology. In essence, there will be 
a continual insertion of technology such that the underlying system is never procured and 
disposed of in the traditional manner2. As for information services, there may be more of a 
reliance on the commercial world to develop the information delivery infrastructure and the 
role of the military will be as "content providers" for its own unique information 
requirements. 
One other point deserves special mention. As one participant commented, perhaps 
the current cycle time is not that long given the nature of the task. While specific 
technologies may be changing every 18 months, the integration of complex military meta-
systems does take more time-just as similar civilian information technology meta-systems 
are not built in a day. 
B. THE SOFTWARE EDGE? 
In the previous topic, several participants mentioned that concentrating on software 
solutions (instead of hardware solutions) and on leasing products (instead of buying 
I Functions will be much more stable than the underlying hardware and software used to implement them. 
2 All of this presupposes common functional standards, a certain amount of b&ekwards compatibility and an 
open, modular meta-system architecture that does not yet exist. 
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products) would be good ways to keep technology refreshed. Such suggestions are the 
focus of this topic and lead naturally to the next Delphi question. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Should there be a shift from hardware to software 
orientation in development? Should we lease hardware and concentrate 
our efforts on incrementally improving software? 
[Campen] The functionality comes from the software; the hardware will provide the bits 
and the bandwidth accordingly and automatically. The emphasis should be on the leasing, 
acquisition or rental of information services, with each new increment improving 
functionality, speed, accuracy, security and reliability. 
[Cebrowski] Warfighting requirements will always dictate development decisions while 
economies prevail in decisions to lease or own. Advancing technology itself has hardware 
and software on a natural collision course-neither will dominate, instead both will fuse 
into mutual dependence. The more important· question is how to shift funding and 
management attention to the requirement and design phases rather than waiting for 
problems to become big and intractable. 
[Cochrane] The split between hardware and software is somewhat arbitrary: you cannot 
divorce them in this way. (Why should you trust hardware more than software? There 
could be just as many problems in the silicon-storing away keys which are picked up by 
a "maintenance" visit for example) We must always consider the whole system, stop 
looking at elements in isolation, concentrating on reducing the time taken to develop 
integrated hardware and software solutions. 
[Cohen] Leasing hardware is an extraordinarily poor investment. It's almost always better 
to buy the hardware and convert older systems for less than state-of-the-art uses. For 
example, even a 5-year old PC is still perfectly capable of being' used for office 
automation junctions. 
[Dunnigan] This has already been going on. 
[Garigue] We should buy hardware like we buy food. So that it can be consumed rapidly 
(ifyou don't it goes bad very quickly). Software on the other hand are the functions that 
are required whatever the hardware. Software is the essence of the system as it represents 
the processes required to support the decision maker. Computers are con_sumable. Most of 
the critical components of the network are already in the commercial sector anyway; what 
makes systems "military" are the fact that the tools and the technology are applied to 
military problems. 
Software itself is being modularized and becoming more and more generic. So there is an 
opportunity to take advantage of this and tailor some systems to our needs. The point in 
all this is to know when our requirements for timeliness, pertinence, accuracy of the data 
cannot be meet by the existing components and to custom design our own solutions. 
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[ Giessler] We should not be developing either hardware or software in the military or the 
national security establishment unless the commercial market is not meeting our needs 
because there is insufficient profitable demand. Even our interoperability needs should be 
met by commercial interface packages. 
[Gust] We in the Army night vision business have a unique incident that we are working. 
During Desert Storm we bought an overstock of Generation I tubes that are now obsolete. 
Since we have moved on to Generation II FLIR [Forward Looking Infrared] technology, 
can we salvage any ojthis "sunk cost"? The answer is we may have found a way to sell 
back to the contractor the older versions for their direct sale to other customers, then 
receive credit on the contract to buy new Generation II devices. Lease of hardware is 
probably a better option for a weapons platform of less dubious value, like a truck. Every 
system the Army is buying now is specifying the Common Operating Environment and 
Army Architecture standard version 4.0. This is a flexible format conducive to the use of 
software upgrades as a process for insertion of increased capability. 
[Hazlett] Yes, we should shift to software solutions where possible, leasing and 
outsourcing hardware where possible. May need to develop "wrappers" or metaphors to 
deal with unruly or yet-to-be-developed components. 
[King] Yes, in most cases, the emphasis should be on software but changes in hardware 
technologies need to be monitored. 
[Loescher] We should concentrate on identifying and categorizing information families and 
let the commercial world worry about hardware and software. If the future, the intelligence 
communities will become less and less useful, though that may be their best kept secret 
yet. The best intelligence, especially for Information Warfare, is going to come from 
industry sources-much like it did in the early days of World War II.. I'm not going to 
want to know what DIA thinks about Guatemala, I'm going to want to know what the 
Guatemalan information infrastructure is-that's not going to come from DIA, or NSA, 
or CIA, that'll come from the commercial sector that does business in Guatemala. 
[Probst] The situation is more complex than that. In large part, DoD needs to use third-
party parallel hardware and software. DoD also needs to articulate the parallel hardware and 
software at the margin that will not be available elsewhere. Certainly the bulk of DoD 
time will be spent in writing defense applications, taking advantage of reuse wherever 
possible. 
[Schwartau] Software must be improved in two ways: 
- Quality of testing and reliability through the use of better automated development tools. 
- Standards for platform migration will alleviate the constant need for total redesign every 
time a new hardware widget comes along. 
[Steele] Not hardware, not software, NOT EVEN DATA COLLECTION. Our focus 
should not be on technology, except in-so-jar as we mandate certain standards of 
performance, but rather on "intelligence," meaning; what information can be discovered, 
discriminated, distilled, and disseminated to the commander so as to enhance mission 
fulfillment? Taking SPOT Imagery as an example: it is not necessary to mandate 
anything other than the fact that we need 1:50,000 with contour lines and precision points 
(either GPS [Global Positioning System] or NRO [National Reconnaissance Office] ... ). 
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2. Commonalities and Differences 
While there was some disagreement, there was also a fairly strong feeling that, in 
general, software should be the focus of military development efforts. This was caveated 
with the notion that most of the software and hardware necessary to meet military needs 
will still be available commercially. Thus any software development sponsored by the 
military would be only for those unique applications that embody the particular 
functionalities needed by the military and not available in the civilian world. Operating 
systems, system utilities, network services, etc. would all be commercially based, while 
some of the applications that sit on top of such a "common operating environment" would 
be specially-developed programs. 
Commercial hardware, on the other hand, is inherently more generic and the prime 
consideration is keeping up with technological improvements since hardware seems to 
become obsolete fairly quickly (much quicker than the functions embodied in software). 
Thus hardware should be thought of more as ·a "consumable commodity" that must be used 
and replaced rapidly, either at the end item level or at the "board" level if the item is 
modular and flexible enough, while mission software, if it is modular, portable and 
reusable, can migrate from older hardware to newer hardware. 
The second part of the question deals with the idea of leasing as a means to keep 
hardware current. An old business saw states "buy items that appreciate, lease items that 
depreciate." There was no clear response from the Delphi members on whether the idea this 
statement embodies is true and whether it is applicable to DoD information technology 
hardware. Some were flatly opposed to leasing, some felt it was the way to go-especially 
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for "commodity" hardware such as workstations and personal computers, and others felt it 
should be a purely economic decision made on a case-by-case basis. 
Finally, both Col. (Ret.) AI Campen and CDR Michael Loescher thought the 
emphasis on hardware and software was misplaced. Instead, they argue for a concentration 
on acquiring or leasing information services. Under this view, worries about keeping 
hardware and software current would logically be left to the commercial world. 
C. TECHNOLOGICAL OVERHANG 
In the past, technologies instrumental in RMAs have often been developed in the 
civilian world and then "imported" by the military for warfighting purposes (Krepinevich, 
Falll994). With the slower pace of earlier technological development, there was usually 
plenty of time for the military to recognize, exploit and integrate such new technologies. 
But with the current rapid rate of development, there may be militarily useful information 
technologies that are not being recognized, exploited or integrated, thus creating a 
"technological overhang" of commercial information technology over currently fielded 
military technology. This question seeks to deal with how the military should recognize and 
"spin on" information technology innovations from the world of commerce. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] With an increasing array of new commercial information 
technologies, who should be responsible for finding these new 
capabilities and how should we conduct commercial-military 
integration? 
[Campen] The user, not some surrogate electronic arsenal attempting to craft a formal 
ROC [Required Operational Capability]. The Air Force Fort Franklin shows the way by 
providing an environment for experimentation, testing and functional demonstration. 
103 
[Cebrowski] The technologist must inform his potential customer, the operator-and 
operator must inform technologists. We shouldn't be concerned about 
commercial-military integration. The DoD should buy the 70-80 percent solution from 
industry; then reengineer business practices and requirements to make that a 100 percent 
solution. We can't afford otherwise. 
[Cochrane] Integration is the wrong approach. Ordinary commercial organisations are 
becoming more aware of the need to have secure systems and therefore demanding the 
same strength as military products. If the military were to specify their needs at an early 
stage the commercial systems would be developed to the military requirements. This 
would produce economies ofscale, reducing the costs of military systems. The military 
would no longer have to identify the capabilities of systems they were getting because 
they specified the capabilities. 
[Cohen] You might try having an advanced technology group in the DoD that constantly 
seeks out new and useful technologies and applications and forwards information on these 
new developments to the appropriate other groups for consideration. 
[Dunnigan] Someone in the military, I hope ... 
[Garigue] All organizations need to be doing some type of technology assessment 
activity. Comparing the recent developments in the commercial world with military 
requirements in test laboratories and doing technology insertion proof of concepts are a 
good way to "test and try." 
[Giessler] The ultimate user should fmd the acquisition with the aid of people at places 
like NRAD, ESC, NRL, ARL [Note: these are all military acquisition or research 
organizations], service labs and academic places like NPS. This is going to be the 
toughest part ... How to stay current and adapt/adopt/acquire/fmdlbe aware of the available 
and useful technology. JWIDs [Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations], Ft. 
Franklin, and ACTDs [Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations] etc., will have to 
be used as well as displays at shows and conferences. We may find that we have to put 
DoD people out in industry just so we can keep abreast of what is going to be available. 
It may require a new specialty officer called the information science and technologist. 
[Gust] The responsible party should be consensus forums, not single function activities 
like ARPA [Advanced Research Projects Agency], laboratories or PMs [Program 
Managers]. Using ACTDs from the R&D community results in the follow-on program 
fund lines to have in them a source of leave-behind funding for O&M [Operations and 
Maintenance] commands to evaluate in the field for two years. Also, fund lines need a 
production wedge for those R&D initiatives that will mature shortly, i.e., those funded at 
a 6.3 or 6.4 [Note: these are different kinds of R&D monies] maturity level. 
[Hazlett] Need to coordinate information management across the services and agencies. 
Take better advantage of economies of scale, like needs and like requirements. 
[King] There needs to be a group that keeps up to date on changes and can understand 
which new items are worth incorporating into the existing systems. It is probably best to 
outsource as much of the actual integration work as possible. 
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[Loescher] I disagree with the premise. The "array" of commercial information 
technologies is becoming more and more homogeneous, as standards become valuable to 
the marketplace. Thus, an information system for MacDonald's in the future will be much 
like that for DoD-they'll just need different information in different times and places. 
[Probst] Well-trained specialists with reasonable career paths. 
[Schwartau] I have no earthy idea how to solve this. How about establishing a technology 
excellence center, a sort of government help desk, which is staffed to address questions 
from interested acquisition officers on what the latest and greatest is. This center should 
also track the real-world commercial implementation of advanced technology, most 
notably in the financial arenas. Why reinvent the wheel for the sake of job security? 
[Steele] Let the free market work its magic. Our biggest enemy now is misplaced security 
constraints which prevent openness, and procurement constraints which give an advantage 
to beltway bandits skilled at paperwork rather than genuine innovators with something 
unique to offer. DoD cannot put its house in order by itself; the White House must offer 
an umbrella program, and a genuine Chief Information Officer network at Undersecretary 
levels, with real resource authority, or the Services will continue to protect pet rocks and 
"special arrangements. " 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
There was an almost general consensus3 among the Delphi members on the 
question of keeping up with new technologies. First, participants felt that keeping up with 
commercial technology requires a partnership between the users and the technologists. The 
users possess a better understanding of operational requirements, while not necessarily 
having the time to keep up with technological developments. Technologists4 have a sense 
of what is technologically possible and should be held responsible for keeping up with new 
3CDR Michael Loescher did disagree with the premise that an "increasing array" of information 
technologies are becoming available. He felt that common standards are driving the commercial world towards 
more "homogeneous" products. While this may be true for product lines that are maturing, it is unclear if this is 
true for the "cutting-edge" technologies that represent new or unique applications of information technologies. 
4Tbese technologists could be from the service research labs (e.g., Army Research Lab, Naval Research 
Lab, the Air Force "Super Labs" like Rome Lab, etc.) and acquisition centers (e.g., the Air Force's Electronic 
Systems Center , the Army's Communications and Electronics Command, etc.), as well as from organizations 
like the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and DARPA. 
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innovations. Working together, via such mechanisms as test beds, technology insertion 
programs, interoperability demonstrations and ACIDs, new commercial information 
technologies can be adapted, exploited and integrated into military units. 
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LOGISTICS 
Much of the Delphi discussion has focused on the development, acquisition and 
fielding of information technologies. However, just as important .is the sustainment of 
those fielded technologies-the logistics support of information technology. This question 
asks how such logistics might be different in a world dominated by commercial information 
technologies. 
1. Delphi Responses 
[Moderator] Given increased use of commercial parts, should the 
military rely more on the commercial world for its information 
technology logistics support? Will it be better to "throw away" a 
broken system and order a new one rather than maintain the capability 
to repair it? 
[Campen] Don't get trapped by the definition of parts for broken THINGS. Other than a 
cheap, commercial, dumb, terminal in the field, that does nothing more than accept 
applets from a global information service supplier, there is nothing to repair. If the dumb 
terminal is broken, then throw it away. The main concern ought to be ensuring 
continuity of information services. 
[Cebrowski] Generally, yes; but where that is too expensive, do something else like 
reassess the requirement. · 
106 
[Cochrane] See previous question. Presume that by "broken" you mean breached security. 
I would say the "new or repair?" question probably needs to be reviewed on a "per case" 
basis. However, it is probably safe to say that repair would be a valid option in many 
cases. The system breach might be ftxed easily with little extra cost and with a good deal 
of confidence in the new level of security, without the worries of implementing a 
completely new system. If the replace option is taken it may be necessary to run the 
broken system until a replacement is available, this necessitates a certain level of repair. 
If a "broken" system were to be replaced it may be redeployed for use with lower grade 
information thus increasing its lifespan. It may be more economical to replace the 
infrastructure of the system with a new one. 
[Cohen] Waste not want not. 
[Dunnigan] The commercial model for operations stresses efficiency, thus it is the one to 
follow (as the military has done for centuries ... ) 
[Garigue] There are no universal rules. The solution must be dictated by the problem and 
not a policy. In many cases there are good reason to dispose of systems in a rapid way. 
The fixed cost of repairing some components are not worth it. Better buy replacements. 
But new components sometimes come at the cost of poor backward compatibility and 
increased dependence on outside organizations. 
[Giessler] Yes to both questions. And often we will throw it away because it is 
superseded-;redistribution will replace maintenance. 
[Gust] Actually, PEO-IEW [Program Executive Officer-Intelligence and Electronic 
Warfare] embarked on a "policy" several years ago that helps to solve this problem. We 
focused on 6UVME-formatted circuitry. This standard has turned out in industry like the 
VHS format in video recorders. With an open bus architecture, it is possible to plug in 
the next generation card and that is better than both repair of the old card or replacement of 
the entire system. 
[Hazlett] The military should rely on civilian components except in those areas where 
there is no civilian equivalent, or there specific requirements that dictate.a "military only" 
solution. Should go to more modular systems that can be incrementally upgraded, so that 
there are very few, true "legacy" systems. Upgrades to olde:i: systems often cost more over 
the long run, and provide less capability gains than new, replacement systems. 
[King] For standard commercial systems, there are several vendors that can provide 
worldwide support. It is normally best to keep spare systems/components and switch to 
those while repairing the broken units. The repair versus throw-away decision should be 
based on economics. 
[Loescher] It's better to do neither. We should lease the infrastructure and pay for it on our 
monthly "information bill." 
[Probst] This is basically a question of outsourcing. If your source is competent, and will 
always be there for you, fine. Otherwise, watch out. 
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[Schwartau] That's a pure cost justification decision. Ask the commercial sector how it 
does it in comparable situations. Also, the IRS should change the depreciation of 
computer equipment from 5 to 2 years. 
[Steele] It depends. On balance, because of the speed with which technology changes, it is 
NOT cost effective nor performance-mandated to protect legacy systems. In fact, they end 
up costing 80 cents on the dollar to maintain. However, there are going to be some 
elements that are not only critical, but too arcane for the private sector--:aruJ this leads to 
an interesting idea: if the private sector does not understand the value of a particular 
system, then either a) it really does not have a value and the military is overestimating its 
value or b) we should declassify the threat that inspired our value, and see if the private 
sector cannot adopt the same standards. 
2. Commonalities and Differences 
There were two threads to the overall question. First is the issue of whether the 
military should rely on commercial logistics support instead of building its own repair 
capability. The answers to this first query were very similar to the responses given to the 
question of whether the military should lease instead of buy. Many felt the decision to 
outsource logistics support to the commercial world should be made on a case-by-case 
basis depending on the particular costs and benefits. 
The second issue involves the decision to repair or discard broken information 
technology items. Again, most felt this would be decided differently for each separate case. 
In those instances where technology is rapidly improving or the current system has little 
inherent flexibility or modularity to allow upgrades, then discarding the item and buying 
new would make sense. But if the technology would allow incremental improvements by 
software updates or board replacements, then repair (done either in-house or commercially) 
might make sense. 
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E. SYNTHESIS 
Several broad threads emerge from this discussion. First is a consensus for an 
incremental approach to information technology acquisition, much like that recommended 
by the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association's (AFCEA) 
Evolutionary Acquisition Study (AFCEA, 1993). To keep up with rapidly advancing 
technology, there should be continual cycles of technology insertion via test beds, 
interoperability demonstrations, ACIDs and experimentss such that the underlying system 
is never procured and disposed of in the traditional manner. Key to accomplishing this 
incremental approach across a "system of systems" are implementation of standard data 
dictionaries, object-oriented and modular designs and well-defined architectures and 
interfaces (Strassmann, 1994). Also critical to the selection of which technologies are ready 
for incremental insertion is a partnership between users who understand operational 
requirements and technologists who are responsible for staying· abreast of technical 
advances and opportunities. Finally, even such incremental improvement cycles can be 
sped up through the use of better acquisition methodologies. In this area the acquisition 
community should take a cue from operational users who are devising "distributed, 
collaborative planning systems" based on advanced information technology as a way to 
deal with the complexity and pace of the modem battlefield. For example, work is 
underway to move from a centrally-planned Air Tasking Order process that took 72 hours 
and was largely static, to a dynamic and distributed Air Tasking Order that is constantly 
updated and has a "cycle time" of perhaps six hours. Much the same may be possible in 
5Jt is also important to note that such experiments be allowed (or even encouraged) to fail without the threat 
of instant program cancellation. Finding flaws quickly-before fielding-allows for early correction and 
promotes the risk-taking necessary for innovation and true "out of the box" thinking. 
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moving from a laborious acquisition planning and execution process to one that is 
characterized by responsiveness and constant interaction among users, developers, 
researchers and commercial firms. 
Second, instead of focusing on the grand acquisition of "systems," the emphasis 
should be on managing the more stable functions that make up the systems and on the 
information services that are required by the user. In many cases those functions will be 
embodied in mission-unique operational software, the importance of which cannot be 
overstated6 in a world where potential foes will have access to the same basic commercial 
hardware and software. A large part of any edge the U.S. possesse~ will be embedded in 
software and thus the focus of the acquisition organization should mainly be on 
development of the operational software and the integration of mostly commercial systems. 
As for information services, there will be more of. a reliance on the commercial world to 
develop the information delivery infrastructure and the role of the military will be as 
"content providers" for its own unique information requirements. 
Finally, decisions on leasing versus buying hardware, in-house versus commercial 
repair, and repair or discard issues will vary between individual situations based on the 
costs and benefits involved. Although the promise does exist of a greater move towards the 
treatment of information technologies as information commodities or information 
"appliances." Thus in many cases it may be cheaper and more effective to lease the 
information technology equivalent of a '96 Lexus for three years, only to trade it in on a 
'99 BMW when the Lexus starts to require more maintenance as it wears out and when the 
6Squadron Leader Peter Emmett argues that "software is a weapon in its own right'' and is key to combat 
effectiveness on a battlefield where most information warfare, C41 and weapons systems are dependent on its 
correct operation (Emmett, 1994). 
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newer BMW offers a qualitative and quantitative advance in performance. A similar 
situation may hold for logistics repair issues. If one buys a television and later has 
problems with it, it is usually cheaper to take it to a commercial vendor for repair. If the 
television is an older model that is no longer in production, it is often less costly to buy a 
completely new model with better capabilities than it is to have the obsolete model repaired. 
The acquisition and logistics system should be poised to take advantage of such 
possibilities whenever they exist. 
One last issue deserves special consideration in terms of a specific impact of 
information warfare on the acquisition process. That issue is how product integrity and 
information warfare dangers are handled during design and development. In order to 
protect systems from information warfare risks, it will be important to ensure the systems 
engineering process includes up-front activities that assess critical areas and that take steps · 
to mitigate information warfare threats to mission-critical system functions. The Air Force's 
Intelligence and Information Warfare Systems Directorate of the Electronic Systems Center 
has developed a comprehensive methodology to perform such an assessment. This 
methodology was recently applied to a major Air Force system that is in the operational test 
and production stages. The assessment resulted in a prioritized set of information warfare 
vulnerabilities and included specific actions the program director could take to reduce those 
vulnerabilities. Plans are underway to apply this methodology to several more programs 
still in the engineering and manufacturing development phase. This type of approach 
should be performed for all new or modified systems in order to explicitly address 
information warfare hazards. (Watters, 1996) 
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In conclusion, "acquisition reform" is an often-used and an almost institutionalized 
phrase in the DoD. Most Americans, both inside and outside of government, feel there are 
fundamental problems with the centrally-managed acquisition process and much effort? has 
been devoted over the years to the challenge of "fixing" the process. This chapter addresses 
just a few of the issues currently facing the acquisition world that have particular pertinence 
to information warfare and that are obviously closely tied to the more generic topic of 
information technology acquisition. 
7While the acquisition establishment certainly is not perfect, much progress has been made in the past few 
years, some of it with direct applicability to the procurement of information technology. For example, among 
others items, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996 repealed the Brooks Act (this repeal now 
gives agencies authority to directly purchase information technologies instead of going through GSA), 
streamlined information technology procurement procedures and included provisions for assessing the feasibility 
of leasing instead of buying (Crean, 1996). 
112 
VIII.' SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the past, research and development were only preparation for the final and decisive 
testing of new systems in battle. Today the kind and quality of new systems which a 
nation develops can decide the battle in advance and make the final conflict a mere 
formality-or can bypass conflict altogether. 
-Bernard Schriever 
At the conclusion of the initial Delphi process, Dr. David Probst remarked, "Our 
opinions are all over the map. No unifying theme has emerged." While this judgment may 
be accurate in terms of specific answers to specific questions, it is important to remember 
the purpose of this modified Delphi process. It was not designed to drive all parties 
towards consensus on all issues, but instead to facilitate a discussion aimed at generating a 
wide range of responses and ideas about information warfare. In this respect, this 
adaptation of the Delphi mechanism was ~success, although back-and-forth dialogue 
between the participants was limited-probably due to the nature of electronic mail and the 
busyness of the participants. In spite of this, at least a few broad themes and specific ideas 
did emerge from the Delphi. These themes and ideas about the nature of information 
warfare and the impacts of information warfare on the acquisition system are summarized 
below. 
A. NATURE OF INFORMATION WARFARE 
As Dr. John Arquilla and Dr. David Ronfeldt state, information warfare has been 
around for ages in some form or another (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1992). But the modem 
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incarnation of information warfare is heavily based on the growing capabilities of and 
dependency on information technology. On one hand, information technology can be used 
to greatly enhance functions of society and warfare. But with such use comes dependency, 
that in turn creates vulnerabilities that may be attacked and must be defended. The process 
of attacking an enemy's information and information technology vulnerabilities for any 
political or military purpose and the protection of one's own information and information 
technology is the essence of information warfare. 
The nature of information warfare is further delineated by the qualities of 
information technology itself-because the relationship between information warfare and 
information technology is deep and fundamental. While many methods of information 
warfare (e.g., propaganda leaflets and physical deception efforts) can exist independent of 
information technology, their effectiveness and usefulness can often be greatly enhanced by 
information technologies. There are also a number of modern information warfare methods 
that are completely dependent on information technologies. In general, these technologies I 
are the same for both waging offensive information war and for protecting against 
information attacks-only the techniques and applications are different. It also should be 
recognized that information warfare conflict has its own physical rules, logical rules and 
inherent limitations based on the unique traits of information technology. These limitations 
must be considered when conducting information warfare in a medium that some call 
"cyberspace." And with a few exceptions, such as electronic warfa.t;"e platforms, there are 
not cleanly separable information warfare systems in the traditional sense. Much as C41 
lSee Chapter III for a list of key technologies. 
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systems, information warfare systems are more collections of hardware, software, 
procedures and people2 than discrete systems like aircraft, ships and missiles. 
It is also evident that dependence on information technology is in large part a 
dependence on commercial information technology. The trend towards use of commercial 
information technology is profound and irreversible and such technologies will be largely 
available to all comers, reducing any purely technical edge to those few items that the 
military is able to develop itself and/or keep closely held. Thus to build any overall 
information warfare edge, it is important to properly adapt one's organization and doctrine 
and to accomplish the timely and correct integration, exploitation and synergistic application 
of commercial and military-unique information technologies3. This need to perform 
effective exploitation and integration, coupled with an increased use of commercial items, 
begs for better cooperation between the military and commercial sectors-especially in 
areas where military concerns coincide with the concerns of the overall market. Issues of 
product integrity, upfront consideration of security concerns during product development 
and the potential benefits of information sharing are all ripe areas for collaboration, 
although the mechanisms to promote such commercial-military teamwork have yet to be 
constructed in ways that take full advantage of the information age. 
Thus part of any advantage in information warfare or any information warfare 
revolution is how effectively one can exploit and integrate new technology. Or said another 
2Jn fact some argue that the best defensive information warfare investment one can make is not in software 
frrewalls or hardware cryptological devices, but in enhanced "wetware" by giving systems administrators better 
training. 
3Tbese activities equate to the organizational adaptation, operational innovation and systems development 
steps of a revolution in military affairs. (Krepinevich, Fall 1994) 
115 
way, the characteristics of modem information warfare make one's information warfare 
edge depend substantially on how well one can develop, acquire and field new information 
technology. This leads to an investigation of whether the character of information warfare 
has specific impacts on technology research and acquisition activities. 
B. ACQUISITION IMPACTS OF INFORMATION WARFARE 
Similar to the steps of a generic revolution in military affairs, the impact of 
information warfare on acquisition can be probed by examining three different areas: 
technology, organization, and policy (or process). 
1. Technology Development 
Technology is a key enabler of information warfare, and advances in technology 
give the promise of even better information warfare capabilities for tomorrow. Such 
advances often stem from the research and development activities conducted throughout 
both industry and the government. But with dwindling R&D funds, it is imperative that the 
military focus its R&D efforts in ways that allow it to concentrate on uniquely military 
needs and to leverage research done in the commercial sector. To do such focusing first 
requires some sort of projection of the technologies that may be crucial for future 
information warfare. Delphi members, along with such groups as the Defense Science 
Board and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, listed many candidates4 in this area and 
gave some recommendations as to which ones the military should and should not support. 
4See Chapter V for lists of specific technologies. 
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Besides looking at specific areas, one can also describe the desired attributes of future 
systems and then support militarily unique research that promote those attributes. For 
example, one might wish that the information warfare technologies of tomorrow be fast, 
small, robust, reliable, secure, fault tolerant, handle large amounts of data, and have a 
superior user interface. Working backwards from such a "feature set'' can help to guide the 
R&D investments of today. 
Sowing the seeds for tomorrow's information warfare technology will also require 
that the military engage with the world-wide commercial sector for the technologies that 
will satisfy a large portion of military needs. An important part of this engagement will be 
"cross-fertilization" between the military and civilian worlds. One reason this cross-
fertilization is needed is so the military can learn how the commercial world operates and 
what it has to offer. The other reason is for the military to communicate its own desires and 
needs to promote understanding of military requirements among the non-defense firms. 
Then the U.S. military (most likely in cooperation with allies) would be free to spend its 
own limited R&D funds on "investments in the margins" to address novel military 
requirements that are not likely to be met by commercial developments. 
2. Acquisition Organization 
Some of the inherent characteristics of information technology may also make 
possible changes in the organizational structure of how information systems or services are 
acquired. Instead of a centrally-managed s acquisition system, one may be able to move to a 
5The centrally-managed acquisition system may be a major "institutional impediment" to the development 
of information warfare capabilities. The current system has a bias towards the one-time procurement of large 
systems designed over years and expected to last over years and sometime decades, as opposed to the incremental 
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more decentralized system where local users determine their own requirements and then 
information technologists6 at the local level are largely free to buy, install and support their 
own equipment and services to meet their own user's information warfare needs. Of course 
this may be workable only if a good portion of the technology is mature enough and if the 
standards and technical frameworks are available which ensure interoperability. Then 
acquisition of specific information warfare technologies·can be "pushed down" to levels 
closer to the warfighters where information systems will be seen more as consumable 
"information appliances" and information services as no different than signing up for 
telephone service. Promoting the activities that enable this type of dec.entralization may be a 
key role of the acquisition world. Such activities would include the continuation of R&D 
for military-unique issues, support for the development of both DoD and commercial 
standards and architectures, development of convenient contract purchase vehicles and the 
demonstration of new technologies as a way to educate users as to what is available. The 
organization to do this may not be that structurally different from today, although it might 
be greatly simplified and streamlined. Instead, it may promote and lead ad hoc alliances of 
users, contractors and others to address specific needs or to collaborate on individual 
programs using modern information technologies such as video-teleconferencing, 
electronic mailing lists and the World Wide Web. 
development and enhancement of smaller systems and the procurement of information services. 
6Such local level "information technologists" must know how to acquire information services or systems, 
understand the promises and pitfalls of new technologies, be able to translate the needs of the warfighter into 
technical requirements and ensure the integration of individual systems into a larger whole. 
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3. Acquisition Process 
Several broad threads emerged from the Delphi discussion about needed changes or 
reforms in the acquisition process. These changes have particular pertinence to information 
warfare, but are obviously closely tied to the more generic topic of information technology 
acquisition. 
First is a consensus for an incremental approach to information technology 
acquisition in order to keep up with rapidly advancing technology. There should be 
continual cycles of technology insertion via test beds, interoperability demonstrations, 
ACIDs and experiments such that the underlying system l.s never procured and disposed of 
in the traditional manner. Key to accomplishing this incremental approach across a "system 
of systems" are the development, adoption and implementation of standard architectures 
and interfaces (such as the Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management 
or TAFIM). Also critical to the selection of which technologies are ready for incremental 
insertion is a partnership between users who understand operational requirements and 
technologists who are responsible for staying abreast of technical advances and 
opportunities. Finally, even such incremental improvement cycles can be sped up through 
the use of better acquisition methodologies that make use of advanced information 
technologies to develop a "distributed, collaborative" acquisition planning and execution 
process characterized by responsiveness and interaction among users, developers, 
researchers and commercial firms. 
Second, instead of focusing on the grand acquisition of "systems," the emphasis 
should be on managing the more stable functions that make up the systems and on the 
information services that are required by the user. In many cases those functions will be 
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embodied in mission-unique operational software, the importance of which cannot be 
overstated in a world where potential foes will have access to the same basic commercial 
hardware and software. A large part of any edge the U.S. possesses will be embedded in 
software and thus the focus of the acquisition organization should mainly be on 
development of the operational software and the integration of mostly commercial systems. 
As for information services, there will be more of a reliance on the commercial world to 
develop the information delivery infrastructUre and the role of the military will be as 
"content providers" for its own unique information requirements. 
Third, decisions on leasing versus buying hardware, in-house versus commercial 
repair, and repair or discard issues will vary between individual situations based on the 
costs and benefits involved. Although the promise does exist of a greater move towards 
information commodities where in many cases it may be cheaper and more effective to lease 
information technology or to discard an obsolete information appl~ance at the end of its 
useful life. The acquisition and logistics system should be poised to take advantage of such 
possibilities whenever they exist. 
Last is the issue of how to promote product integrity and identify information 
warfare dangers during design and development. In order to protect systems from 
information warfare risks, it will be important to ensure the systems engineering process 
includes up-front activities that assess critical areas and that take steps to mitigate 




One key part of the modem RMA which is currently underway is the possibility of 
the development of a new form of warfare-often called ~formation warfare. As part of an 
RMA, development of information warfare depends on technological changes, systems 
development and the adaptation of operational approaches and organizational structures in 
order to take advantage of this new capability. In the military, much of the focus has rightly 
been on assessing the doctrinal, operational and organizational issues of the information 
warfare revolution. But much less attention has been paid to the specific impacts of 
information warfare on technology research and acquisition activities. Thus the focus of 
this thesis is on assessing the nature of information warfare and the implications of the 
defining characteristics of information warfare for the research and acquisition systems. 
The underlying motivation is to ensure that the U.S. military is correctly postured to "win 
the IW RMA" by effectively researching, developing and acquiring information warfare 
capabilities. 
In terms of the underlying nature of information warfare, it is clear there is not a 
textbook answer as to what information warfare does and does not encompass. Thus it is 
probably more useful to focus on what is new about information warfare as a starting point 
for assessing the impacts of information warfare. From this perspective, the most obvious 
characteristic is a dependence on information technology?-with most of these technologies 
either developed or available in the commercial world. This reliance on commercial 
7It became hard to separate the acquisition of information warfare capabilities from the generic process of 
acquisition of information technology itself. Often the basic differentiating factor between acquiring information 
warfare capabilities and say, C41 capabilities, is the use to which the information technologies are applied. So 
many of the conclusions of this thesis deal with the broader subject of information technology acquisition and 
thus may apply to areas beyond the acquisition of information warfare systems or services. 
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technology is key and will be the driving force behind many of the changes required in 
military information technology research and acquisition. As information technology is 
popularized, standardized and commercialized, it becomes more and more difficult for the 
military to ignore the cost and quality benefits inherent in using products designed to 
compete in the free market. 
Armed with the assumption that the bulk of information warfare technologies will 
come from the commercial sector, one must then tackle the question of what the centrally-
managed military research and acquisition system should be doing. It seems clear there is 
still a role for the acquisition world, although it may be somewhat different from today. 
First, it should identify those areas where the business world is .not likely to address 
military needs. This is the same type of activity already done for other technologies useful 
to the military. As an example, many aerospace technologies used by the military are 
widely available from commercial aerospace companies. But items like ejection seats and 
missile launchers are not standard commercial fare and so the military must provide the 
financial impetus for the development and acquisition of such products. The same is true 
for military-unique technologies useful in information warfare. 
Second, the trend towards decentralization of information technology procurement 
should be vigorously pursued. With the development of commercial standards and a joint 
DoD-wide architecture that promotes interoperability and technology insertion, it is possible 
that skilled local users will be able to quickly procure and build systems to better meet their 
own needs. The acquisition community should not fight this trend in an attempt to keep 
control over standards, especially since the interoperability record of past centrally-
procured systems has been less than spectacular. Nor should the issues of logistics support 
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necessarily be a barrier. With dependence on commercial technology, logistics may consist 
of discarding the "information appliance" and buying/leasing the newer version just put out 
by the business world. Instead the acquisition community should promote such 
decentralization by bringing its technological savvy to bear on the development of standards 
and architectures, by building easy-to-use contract vehicles for local warfighters to use, by 
providing systems integration expertise, by promoting new advances through incremental 
technology insertion and by concentrating on enhancing the underlying functions and 
services of systems. This last point bears further discussion. The more stable functions of 
information technology systems will largely be embodied in operational mission software. 
Based on the generic hardware and software available in the commercial arena, it is the 
mission software that truly makes a system a "military" system. Development and 
acquisition of this software is one of the most important activities for the acquisition 
community. 
Finally, turning away from generic information technology a~quisition topics, there 
is the specific issue of information protection during systems acquisition and development. 
Since dependence on commercial technology engenders an accompanying vulnerability to 
commercial technology, it is important to assess the risks posed by these vulnerabilities 
"upfront and early" in the development cycle. Methodologies already exist to perform such 
assessments as part of the engineering process-and these methodologies should be 
strengthened and their use expanded to all new or modified systems. In addition, concerns 
about product integrity because of software backdoors and "chipping" must be addressed. 
Since these problems are of interest to commercial fums as well, the military should seek to 
123 
engage much more closely with the traditionally non-defense firms who are providing 
much of the military's information infrastructure in order to deal with these concerns. 
In sum, the defining characteristics of information warfare do prompt the need for 
changes in the acquisition community. These changes range from focusing R&D on 
military-unique technologies useful in information warfare to organizational modifications 
in information technology acquisition to adjustments and improvements in the acquisition 
process. Finally, in spite of any organization and operational adaptations made to 
accommodate information warfare, without changes in the realms of technology research 
and systems development, it is probable the U.S. military will not realize the full promise 
of information warfare. 
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